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STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
A CONCERTO FOR COURT, COUNCIL AND COMMITTEE
RACHAEL LORNA JOHNSTONE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The judgment in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention
case), released by the International Court of Justice (the Court) on 2 6 th February
2007, has thrown up a number of interesting issues to keep scholars of
international law entertained for some years.1 Amongst these are the rules of state
responsibility in international law. In the Genocide Convention Case, the Court
relied upon the narrow regime of state responsibility that they had introduced in
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua) over
20 years previously, rejecting a stronger doctrine suggested by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadi6 case.2 The
Court's conservative interpretation of state responsibility does not immediately
appear to be in harmony with the regimes of state responsibility envisaged by other
United Nations institutions, notably, state responsibility for terrorist activities as
understood by the Security Council (the Council), and the tertiary scheme of state
responsibility for violations of human rights adopted and applied by the United
Nations human rights treaty bodies (treaty bodies).
* Rachael Loma Johnstone is assistant professor of law at the University of Akureyri, Iceland
where she has been based since 2003. She has studied at the University of Glasgow (LL.B.(Hons),
1999), the European Academy of Legal Theory, Brussels (LL.M., 2000) and the University of Toronto
(S.J.D., 2004). This article is the fruits of a research sabbatical hosted by the Raoul Wallenberg
Institute, Lund, Sweden and the DIGITA institute, University of Genoa, Italy. She would like to thank
the faculty and support staff at these institutions, in particular, Rolf Ring, Gu6mundur Alfredsson and
Habteab Tesfay (RWI) and Pierluigi Chiassoni (DIGITA). She would also like to thank the editorial
team at the Denver Journal of International and Comparative Law for their work in preparing and
finalizing this article for publication. All errors are the author's own.
I .Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188 (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Genocide Convention
case].
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua]; Prosecutor v. Tadi6, No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 1 131, 137 (July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadi6].
3. For discussion of the tertiary framework of state responsibility as applied by human rights
treaty bodies see, for example, Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of
Women: A Complaints Procedure for the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679, 711 (1996)
(identifying the three dimensions of state obligations relating to "any given human right" as the
obligation to respect, the obligation to protect, and the obligation to fulfill).
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After this short introduction, Part II will discuss the rules of state
responsibility applied by the Court in the Genocide Convention case, in light of the
International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, Nicaragua
and Tadi6.4 Part III is devoted to an examination of resolutions of the Council
pertaining to terrorism, particularly following the terrorist attacks of September
2001, and the vision of state responsibility implicit therein. In Part IV, the author
will examine the adoption of the tertiary scheme of state responsibility for human
rights adopted by the treaty bodies which is illustrated in general comments,
concluding comments on state reports, and where appropriate, views on
communications. To conclude in Part V, the author will argue that the different
schemes of state responsibility can all be reconciled with the ILC Articles and that
the apparent differences between these three fields are in fact differences of
primary rules. The answer to the question "who is the state?" is the same in all
three cases.
The focus is exclusively on the institutions of the United Nations and, for that
reason, developments in the realm of state responsibility in other institutions, such
as the European Court of Human Rights or in broader counter-terrorism literature
will not be directly addressed.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
GENOCIDE
A. The International Court of Justice
Formally at least, judicial decisions are binding only between the parties to
each dispute.5 They are formally considered only "subsidiary sources" of
international law, alongside legal commentaries.6 Treaties, customary international
law, and legal principles of civilized nations are preferred. Nonetheless, the
Court's decisions are highly influential both on the academic study of international
law and state practice. Indeed Dupuy states: "everyone accepts that its judicial
interpretations are for the most part binding on all the subjects of international
law." 7 The Statute of the Court does not indicate any hierarchy amongst courts,
referring only to "judicial decisions" without indicating any particular fora.
8
Nevertheless, the practice of the Court, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been to cite its
own decisions with a degree of gravitas that is perhaps not shared in its discussion
of decisions of other international tribunals or domestic courts. In the Genocide
Convention case, the Court clearly preferred its own 20 year old Nicaragua ruling
4. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its fifty-third
session, art. 6, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC
Articles].
5. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 [hereinafter Statute
of the Court].
6. Id. art. 38(1)(d).
7. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the "Fragmentation"
of International Law, EUR. J. LEGAL STUD., Apr. 2007, at 1, 5, http://www.ejls.eu/index.phpmode
=present&displayissue-2007-04 (follow hyperlink to Dupuy's article).
8. Statute of the Court, supra note 5, art. 38(l)(d).
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to the more recent Tadi6 decision of the ICTY. 9 It makes no reference to the
jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal despite its influence on the
development of the law of state responsibility.l
0
B. The Genocide Convention Case
Ultimately, in the Genocide Convention case, Serbia (formerly the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) was not found to have any responsibility for the
commission of genocide, conspiracy or incitement to commit genocide, or
complicity in genocide. 1 It was, however, considered responsible for violating the
Genocide Convention to the extent that Serbia failed to prevent the genocide and
failed to cooperate adequately with the prosecution of individuals suspected of
involvement.12 It was also held to have failed to comply with the provisional
measures of the Court, issued in 1993, which required it specifically to "take all
measures within its power to prevent genocide."'
13
Before approaching questions of state responsibility, it is important to note
that the only question before the Court was responsibility for genocide, not for any
other international wrongs, such as acts of aggression or violation of the duty not
to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. 14 The only matter for which
the Court determined that genocide had been proven to have been committed was
the massacre at Srebrenica. 15 Therefore, the question of state responsibility in the
case pivots on that sequence of events. A state can only commit genocide, or be
complicit in the commission of genocide, to the extent that genocide actually takes
place.16 Serbian responsibility for any other atrocity during the conflict was not
assessed by the Court.
On the other hand, responsibility for conspiracy to commit genocide,
incitement to commit genocide, or attempting to commit genocide does not
necessarily require that genocide be successfully carried out. 17 Indeed, to the extent
9. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 1 405-07.
10. See generally David D. Caron, The Basis of Responsibility: Attribution and Other Trans-
Substantive Rules, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 109 (Richard B. Lillich & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds., 1998) [hereinafter
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL]. See also Jamison Selby Borek, Other State
Responsibility Issues, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 303, supra.
11. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 11 471(2)-(4).
12. Id. 471(5)-(6).
13. Id. 471(7).
14. In their identification of the actus reus of genocide, a litany of atrocities is recited in the
Court's judgment. Although the Court could not rule on whether they constituted war crimes or crimes
against humanity, the detail in which they are recited in the judgment indicates that the Court wanted
them on public record. Sandesh Sivakumaran argues that: "[a]s jurisdiction was founded solely upon
the Genocide Convention, the Court could not characterise these atrocities as war crimes or crimes
against humanity, however, in practice, it came close to doing precisely that." Sandesh Sivakumaran,
Case Comment, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695, 698
(2007).
15. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 376.
16. Id. 1431.
17. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
2008
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that genocide is actually committed, there can be no charge of attempt on the same
facts. 1 8 Nonetheless, even on these points, the Court contained its analysis of
attribution largely to the events at Srebrenica.
9
All kinds of questions can be asked about the standing of the parties, 20 the
definition of genocide both in the Convention and in customary international law,21
imputation from non-disclosure by Serbia,22 the burden of proof,23 the degree to
which the Court can make inferences from the circumstances when direct evidence
is almost impossible to obtain, 24 the limitations on the Court vis d vis fact-
finding,25 and the Court's reluctance to "put the pieces together, 26 but these
questions, interesting as they are, do not bear directly on the issue of attribution of
responsibility and so will not be addressed further.
It must be borne in mind that the wrong (i.e. the genocide) was committed not
in Serbia but in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) against Bosnian victims. Any
potential responsibility of Serbia for actions taking place at Srebrenica in 1995
cannot depend on some kind of territorial link, as it might have, had the genocide
occurred within the territory of Serbia.27 In this respect, the case can be
distinguished from questions of responsibility for "harboring terrorists" when those
terrorists are actually on the soil of the respondent state and from responsibility for
human rights violations committed by non-state actors when both the perpetrators
and victims are within a state's territory.28
C. State responsibility for genocide
Bosnia attempted to pre-empt the need for an investigation on the facts of
state responsibility by arguing that Serbia had acknowledged responsibility in a
statement by its Council of Ministers. 29 This was rejected by the Court as a
"political statement" rather than an admission of liability.30 The Court was
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
18. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 380.
19. The Court briefly commented that there was no indication of genocide having been incited
elsewhere. See id 417. Bosnia did not make any claim for "attempt." See id 416. See infra text
accompanying note 66.




24. Id. 207. See also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu
Channel].
25. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 211-230.
26. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 42, 48 (Feb. 26, 2007) (dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-
Khasawneh), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p 1 =3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&
p3 -4 [hereinafter AI-Khasawneh dissent].
27. But see Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 18.
28. See infra Parts III, IV.
29. Ademola Abass, Proving State Responsibility for Genocide: The ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia and
the International Commission of inquiry for Darfur, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 871, 902-03 (2008).
30. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 377-78. Al-Khasawneh disagreed. See Al-
Khasawneh dissent, supra note 26, 56-58.
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therefore obliged to consider both the law of state responsibility and the
application of that law to the facts of the case.31
The Court recognized the established principle that states bear responsibility
for acts or omissions of their own organs, de jure or de facto, or by non-state actors
operating under the "direction or control" of the state.32 Articles 4 and 8 of the
ILC Articles were accepted as "customary international law" without further
discussion.33 They are worth replicating in full:
Article 4
Conduct of organs of a State
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in
the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of
the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in
accordance with the internal law of the State.
Article 8
Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act
of the State under international law if the person or group of persons is
in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct.
Relying on the "customary international law" of state responsibility, the Court
rejected any notion that the rules of state responsibility for genocide were in any
way lex specialis. 34 Although the Genocide Convention creates treaty obligations,
the (secondary) rules of state responsibility for violating those obligations are the
general ones. No special scheme applies.35
The principle perpetrators recognized by the Court were not, under Serbia's
internal law, its "organs. '36 Straightforward attribution of responsibility according
to Article 4 was therefore precluded, notwithstanding Bosnia's protestations to the
contrary. Nonetheless, states may not hide behind their internal legal order to
evade international responsibility and the Court discussed at length whether or not
those involved were de facto agents of Serbia, relying on the Nicaragua test of
"complete dependence" in light of Article 4 of the ILC Articles.37
31. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 1 385-438.
32. Id. 1384.
33. Id. TT 385, 398.
34. Id. 401.
35. Id.
36. Id. 1 386-89.
37. Id. 1 391-92. See also Nicaragua, supra note 2, 109, at 62. Although not cited by the
Court, this is also in line with the findings of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. See generally THE IRAN-
UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, supra note 10. See also ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 4,
2008
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The Court accepted on the facts that those involved had been recruited prior
to the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the Serbian government
had provided military and financial support in the form of weapons and salaries.
38
Close ethnic, political and financial links existed between the perpetrators (de jure
organs of the "non-State" entity of Republika Srpska in Bosnia) and the Belgrade
Government.
39
But the Court considered that, in light of Nicaragua:
[T]o equate persons or entities with State organs when they do not have
that status under internal law must be exceptional, for it requires proof
of a particularly great degree of State control over them, a relationship
which the Court's Judgment quoted above [Nicaragua] expressly
described as "complete dependence". It remains to be determined in the
present case whether, at the time in question, the persons or entities that
committed the acts of genocide at Srebrenica had such ties with the
FRY that they can be deemed to have been completely dependent on
it.
40
The Court went on to interpret "complete dependence" as meaning that the
perpetrators were "lacking any real autonomy. 41 Recognizing the Bosnian Serb's
"qualified, but real, margin of independence" on the one hand, and their reliance
on Serbian support "without which it could not have 'conduct[ed] its crucial or
most significant military and paramilitary activities,"' the Court determined that
the former factor was the key, and that, since the Bosnian Serb forces had some
modicum of autonomy, they were not to be considered organs of Serbia.42
Therefore, they would not be considered organs and as a result, their actions would
not automatically be attributable to Serbia.
The Court then turned to the question of whether, although not organs of
Serbia in general, the perpetrators were acting under Serbian "direction and
control" "in carrying out the conduct" in light of Article 8. The state will be
responsible for non-state actors to the extent that "they acted in accordance with
that [s]tate's instructions or under its effective control., 44 This responsibility
requires direction or control over specific, identifiable events, in this case, the
Srebrenican genocide. General control over the direction of operations is
inadequate; there must have been specific control over the international wrongful
11, at 91 (the use of "includes" in art. 4(2) clearly indicates that internal law is not exhaustive). See
also Paolo Palchetti, Comportamento di Organi di Fatto e Illecito Internazionale Nel Progetto di
Articoli Sulla Responsabilihi Internazionale Degli Stati, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA RESPONSABILITA
INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI ALLA PROVA DE1 FATTi 3, 5-6 (Marina Spinedi et al. eds., 2006).
38. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 11238-39, 388.
39. Id. 1 240, 422.
40. Id. 393.
41. Id. 394.





act.4 5 The Court explained that "[i]t must however be shown that this 'effective
control' was exercised, or that the [S]tate's instructions were given, in respect of
each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of
the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the
violations." 46 Serbia would still be responsible if it could be established that "the
physical acts constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs or
persons other than the [S]tate's own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on
the instructions or directions of the [S]tate, or under its effective control. ' ' 7
The Court was forced to acknowledge the Tadi6 ruling of the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY in 1999, which had applied a less strict test of "overall
control., 48 The ICTY Appeals Chamber had determined that the test of state
responsibility for the actions of combatants was essential to the determination of
the character of the Bosnia conflict as "international" and, relying on its own
interpretation of the law of state responsibility, held that Serbia had sufficient
control over actors in the Bosnian conflict both to engage its own responsibility
and to render the conflict international in character. 49 The Appeals Chamber,
however, misread Nicaragua as introducing a double test of "complete
dependence" and "effective control" rather than two independent tests of
"complete dependence" or "effective control., 50 Nevertheless, it rejected the
Nicaragua test (so understood) as unpersuasive and appealed both to the 1998 draft
of ILC Article 8 and judicial and state practice (predominantly jurisprudence from
outside of the Court).51 Instead, the Appeals Chamber held that the appropriate test
in military or paramilitary cases should be one of "overall control", rather than
"effective control.",52 It further defended this test by distinguishing between state
responsibility for individual actors and responsibility for the operations of
"organised and hierarchically structured group[s] such as a military unit" where
effective control may not be necessary to achieve the desired objectives.53 Given
45. Giulio Bartolini, Il Concetto di "Controllo" sulle Attivitci di Individui Quale Presupposto
Della Responsabilitei Dello Stato, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA RESPONSABILITA INTERNAZIONALE
DEGLI STATI ALLA PROVA DEI FATTI, supra note 37, at 25, 28.
46. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 400.
47. Id. 401.
48. Tadid, supra note 2, 98-145; Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 402-05. For
commentary on the Tadi6 case as it pertains to state responsibility, see, e.g., Andre J.J. De Hoogh,
Articles 4 and 8 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the Tadi6 case and attribution of acts
of Bosnian Serb Authorities to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 72 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 255 (2001);
Bartolini, supra note 45; Leo Van Den Hole, Towards a Test of the International Character of an
Armed Conflict: Nicaragua and Tadi6, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 269, 276-85 (2005); Marko
Milanovi6, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 553, 576-81(2006); Sivakumaran,
supra note 14, at 701-03.
49. Tadi6, supra note 2, 104, 162.
50. Id. 112.
51. Id. 116-45. The 1998 draft art. 8 of the ILC Articles is identical to that finalized in the
second reading.
52. Id. 145.
53. Id. 120; Bartolini, supra note 45, at 30.
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this lower threshold of overall control, on the facts, it found that the test of "overall
control" by the Yugoslav army (i.e. de jure organ of Serbia) of Bosnian Serb
forces had been met.
54
Nicaragua and Tadi6 could further have been distinguished on the facts, as
the links between the state and those violating international law seem considerably
closer in the latter case.55 The Presiding Trial Judge, although outvoted, argued
that, on the facts, even the stricter test of effective control had been met.
56
Furthermore, although the Appeals Chamber did not apply the facts to the test of
effective control, its discussion of the facts certainly indicates a degree of control
considerably greater than that in Nicaragua. 57
The Court chose to "distinguish" the Tadi6 judgment to the extent that it bears
on state responsibility, but it did so with barely concealed disdain, suggesting that
the ICTY had no business making assertions about "issues of general international
law which do not lie within the specific purview of its jurisdiction and, moreover,
the resolution of which is not always necessary for deciding the criminal cases
before it." 58 The Nicaragua test was thus confirmed as the correct one and is thus
further entrenched in international law.
It should be noted that Article 8 of the ILC Articles requires "direction or
control" but is silent as to the degree of control. 59 The commentary describes both
the Nicaragua tests and Tadi6 tests and does not explicitly indicate a preference.60
However, it implies that the "overall control" test in Tadi6 may not go to the heart
of the law of state responsibility since it was incidental to a finding on international
humanitarian law rather than a direct finding on state responsibility per se -
something that is in any case outside of its jurisdiction.
61
D. Conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide
Bosnia did not claim that Serbia had "attempted" to commit genocide but,
nonetheless, the question of participation by conspiracy, incitement and complicity
still had to be considered by the Court. It dealt with conspiracy and incitement in
summary fashion, dedicating only one paragraph to both, to reject the possibility of
Serbian responsibility. 62 It considered only events at Srebrenica. The perpetrators
had been shown to be neither agents of Serbia, nor under its "effective control" and
the massacre is later in the judgment characterized as a somewhat spontaneous
63action. To the extent that the Court even accepted there had been much of a
54. Tadi6, supra note 2, 1156.
55. Van Den Hole, supra note 48, at 280-85; Bartolini, supra note 45, at 28-29.
56. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, McDonald Dissent, 1 34 (May 7, 1997).
57. Tadi6, supra note 2, 11 146-62.
58. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 403. See also Tadi6, supra note 2, 1 69-71
(argument of the prosecution); AI-Khasawneh dissent, supra note 26, 11 36-39.
59. ILC Articles, supra note 4, at 45.
60. Id. cmt. to art. 8, 11 4-5, at 105-06.
61. Id. cmt. to art. 8, 5, at 106. See also Bartolini, supra note 45, at 30 (suggesting that the ILC
distanced itself from Tadi6).




"conspiracy," rather than a spur of the moment decision, it rejected Serbian
involvement in it.64 Incitement was likewise rejected.65
The Court briefly added that there was no "precise and incontrovertible
evidence" that Serbia had "incited genocide" on any other occasion.66 No such
general statement is made in the case of conspiracy. Conspiracy has its origins in
the common law and does not require that any (other) crime be committed or
attempted.67 It has no direct equivalent in the civil law systems under which
responsibility for planning criminal activities requires some "material element" to
have been committed.68 Focusing only on Srebrenica, the Court does not consider
the possibility that Serbia may have participated in an overall plan to commit
genocide in Bosnia, or to commit genocide on some other occasion. Incitement is
an offence at common law even in the absence of actus reus; in fact, if the actus
reus is fulfilled, the inciter (counselor) is instead considered as an accessory.6 9 In
the civil law, responsibility for incitement requires some attempt.
70
The Court stated that it considered, both for "conspiracy to commit genocide"
and "direct and public incitement to commit genocide" "as is appropriate, only the
events at Srebrenica. ' '71 If, indeed, this is appropriate, conspiracy and incitement
to genocide in international law are (now) only crimes to the extent that they are
successfully carried out.7 2 This will have major ramifications if it is carried over
into the realm of international criminal law and individual responsibility, to the
extent that conspiracies to commit genocide and incitement to genocide, in the
absence of any attempt, will not be considered crimes.
E. Complicity in genocide
Complicity in genocide (or any other crime) requires the crime actually have
occurred.73 The Court necessarily limited its consideration to Srebrenica and
found complicity to be synonymous with "aid or assistance., 74 The material
element, or actus reus, was established as:
64. The Court does not directly address the matter of whether there had been a conspiracy to
commit genocide at Srebrenica. One would imagine that such events require at least minimal
discussion and preparation (i.e. conspiracy); on the other hand, later in the case, the Court indicates that
the Srebrenican massacres were somewhat impulsive. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 423.
65. Id. 417.
66. Id.
67. Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 1(1) (Eng., Wales, Scot., & N. Ir.).
68. CODE PENAL [C. PlN.], art. 450-1 (Fr.).
69. See Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94, § 8 (Eng., Wales, & N. Ir.).
70. See MICHAEL ALLEN, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 212, 215-16, 219 (9th ed. 2007); CODE
PftNAL [C. PltN.], art. 121-4 TO 121-7(Fr.); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 127 § 26, available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/56/
6f/b7295280cbb8cf24d08caa065790.pdf
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[T]he quite substantial aid of a political, military and financial nature
provided by the FRY to the Republika Srpska and the VRS [Bosnian
Serb], beginning long before the tragic events of Srebrenica, continued
during those events. There is thus little doubt that the atrocities in
Srebrenica were committed, at least in part, with the resources which
the perpetrators of those acts possessed as a result of the general policy
of aid and assistance pursued towards them by the FRY.75
But the offence also requires a mental element, in this case, at a minimum,
"knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act" by an organ,
de jure or de facto of the Serbian state.76 "Knowledge of the circumstances" in this
case meant knowledge of the genocidal intention of the perpetrators.77 A suspicion
would be inadequate; knowledge of mass killings would be inadequate. Only
supply of the material support, while "clearly aware" that "not only were
massacres about to be carried out or already under way, but that their perpetrators
had the specific intent characterizing genocide, namely, the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a human group, as such" would suffice. 78 This was not proven
"beyond any doubt" [sic].
79
F. Preventing and punishing genocide
Under the Court's vision of state responsibility, Serbia was thus found not to
be responsible for the genocide, or for assisting with it in any way. Those who
were responsible were not to be considered agents of Serbia; the organs of Serbia,
to the extent they were involved, were not considered to have the mens rea for
genocide, or at least, it was not so proven beyond reasonable doubt.80
But the Convention also mandates positive duties on states to prevent
genocide and to punish individual perpetrators. 81 The Court decided that both of
these duties had been violated by the Serbian authorities.
82
The Court carefully distinguished the duty to prevent genocide from
complicity on both material and mental aspects. The material aspect of complicity
requires positive action; whereas responsibility to prevent genocide can be engaged
by omission. 83 Further, complicity requires a proven knowledge of the genocidal
intentions and actions of the primary perpetrators; the obligation to prevent can be
breached if the state knows only of a "serious danger that acts of genocide would
be committed.,
84






81. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 1.





Positive assistance, in the form of substantial military and financial aid, had
already been established;85 thus, the Court was not required to address in depth the
question of what particular positive duties might be entailed by the Convention to
prevent genocide. Responsibility pivoted on the degree of knowledge of Serbian
organs of the risk of genocide.
86
The evidence included the two provisional Orders of the Court from 1993
requiring that Serbia ensure that
military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or
supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be
subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of
genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide.
87
This is clearly a much wider category than those over whom Serbia exercises
"effective control." 88 The Court also recognized Serbia's "position of influence"
over the Bosnian Serbs involved at Srebrenica, relying on the Secretary-General's
report to the General Assembly The Fall of Srebrenica and evidence that lead the
ICTY to determine that "it must have been clear that there was a serious risk of
genocide in Srebrenica." 89 The failure to intervene, and indeed the continued
support offered, given this degree of knowledge, demonstrated a violation of the
obligation under the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide.
90
The Court in so deciding also managed to characterize Serbia as a special case
because of its relationship with the Bosnian Serbs, avoiding broader questions of
the duty to prevent genocide by other state parties to the Genocide Convention.
91
The duty to prevent is an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result




88. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 3, 24
(Apr. 8). See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v Serb. & Mont.), Further Requests for Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J.
325, 349-50 (Sept. 13); Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 435. Serbia was found separately to
have breached these orders. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 453-56.
89. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 434-38. See The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, 494-97,
at 106-07, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999).
90. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 438.
91. See id. 429-30. On the rights and duties of humanitarian intervention more broadly, see
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 3.1-3.41 (2001).
92. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 430. The French text is here included to
distinguish the French concept of obligation de moyens. On the potential for confusion, see Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago's Classification of Obligations of
Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 371 (1999).
The distinction was dropped from the text of the second reading but is still important, see JAMES
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requires the state to take particular steps regardless of whether or not they would
have been likely to achieve a particular outcome. 93 Ultimately, the Court does not
find it proven to a "sufficient degree of certainty" that even had Serbia intervened
to attempt to prevent the genocide, it would have been successful. 9 4 Serbia acted
wrongfully, but causation is insufficiently proven to award any material remedy.
95
The Genocide Convention finally requires states to ensure the punishment of
genocide, either through domestic tribunals or at an "international penal
tribunal., 96 Since the genocide was committed outside of Serbia, there was no duty
to try suspects in its domestic courts. 97 However, given the establishment of the
ICTY as a suitable "international penal tribunal" Serbian cooperation was required
but lacking.98
The positive obligations to prevent and punish genocide are subject to the
standard of due diligence. 99  The exact requirements of due diligence vary
according to the primary rules at stake, but in all cases it is a standard of
international law - the degree of care a state takes in its own domestic affairs is not
a relevant factor. l00 The degree of care to be exercised also varies depending on the
primary obligation. Pisillo-Mazzeschi explains that in some cases, the standard
will be that of a "civilised" or "well-organized" state but in others, performance
must be excellent, such as in the care of foreign dignitaries. ° l
Responsibility for breach of positive obligations does not depend on fault
attributable to any particular state organ, but is rather an objective standard, which
must be based on the actions and omissions of the state taken as a whole." 2 To the
extent that positive obligations are breached, there is no need to identify a state
organ or agent of the state to be held accountable. 0 3 The point is not that some
organ or agent has acted in such a way as to violate international law, but rather
that no organ or agent has acted, when one ought to have done so. It need not be
the case that some particular organ can be considered at fault; the fault might even
be that there is no appropriate organ when there ought to be.104 Pisillo-Mazzeschi
explains:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 21 (2002).
93. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 430.
94. Id. 462.
95. Id. 460-62.
96. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 6.
97. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 442.
98. Id. 445-49.
99. Id. 430.
100. Id. 429; see also Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the
International Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN YB INT'L L. 9,41-42 (1992).
101. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 44-45; see also Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
429-30.
102. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 179.
103. Id. 182.
104. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 26.
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The practice, in fact, clearly indicates that it is enough to have, for
purposes of responsibility, a general insufficiency of "governmental
action" or a general lack of diligence on the part of the State authorities
considered as a whole, as regards the international standard; and that it
is not necessary instead to carry out an investigation to establish each
time the subjective fault of the single individuals acting as State organs.
105
G. Who is the State? Entrenching Nicaragua
The Court has thus given the Nicaragua test of state responsibility fresh
impetus 20 years after it originally formulated the same. States bear responsibility
only for the actions of their de jure organs, de facto organs by virtue of complete
dependence or agents by virtue of effective control in individual operations. A
veneer of independence will continue to shield states from responsibility for the
actions of those who do not display governmental insignia. 06
Positive obligations to prevent and punish genocide are recognized, subject to
the due diligence standard. It is an obligation that falls on the state machinery.
However, even where due diligence is manifestly lacking, such as in the present
case, in the absence of a clear causal link to any resulting harm (dommage), i.e.
absence of undisputable evidence that intervention would have successfully
prevented the harm, there will be no remedy beyond the metaphorical slap on the
wrist. 107
III. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
TERRORISM
A. Terrorism in International Law
The attacks on 1l1h September 2001 on the United States created an
international shockwave by virtue of the scale of destruction and death, the lack of
prior warning and the targeting of civilians of the professional classes. The
response of the international community was unprecedented as United Nations
organs and states, including states with which the United States had antagonistic
relations, immediately expressed their sympathies. 10 8 The Security Council, on the
105. Id. at 43. On fault and its role in some, but not all primary rules, see CRAWFORD, supra note
92, at 13.
106. In the context of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, David Caron has suggested that this creates a
kind of "fortuity of proof' as responsibility depends on being able to establish that, inter alia, he "wore
a Revolutionary Guards' armband." Caron, supra note 10, at 109, 151.
107. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 463.
108. G.A. Res. 56/1, 2, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/1 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C.
Res. 1368, 1-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). As well as predictable allies such as Israel
and the United Kingdom, the leaders of states that had perhaps less than friendly relations with the
United States, such as Cuba, Iran, Syria and the Taleban in Afghanistan also expressed their disapproval
and sympathies. Only the Iraqi administration openly celebrated. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 13th plen.
mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (Oct. 1, 2001); U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 15th plen. mtg., at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/56/PV.15 (Oct. 2, 2001); U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 16th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.16
(Oct. 3, 2001); Susan Hall, Suzanne Goldenberg & John Hooper, Palestinian Joy, Global
Condemnation, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2001; Suzanne Goldenberg, Rory McCarthy & Brian
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suggestion of the French President, forewent the conventional show of hands to
pass their resolution in favor of voting "by standing, in a show of unity in the face
of the scourge of terrorism."' 0 9
To the rest of the world and the Council, indeed even to the United States,
terrorism was not a new threat, even if the attacks on September the 1 1 th
demonstrated a degree of organization and destruction that seemed to reach a new
level. Beginning with the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft in 1963 there are now no less than thirteen United
Nations Conventions and Protocols on terrorism, twelve of which preceded
2001.110
Despite this glut of treaty law, terrorism has yet to be unequivocally defined,
and as long as the conventions each focus on distinct manifestations, such as
hijacking,"1  bombings,' 12 hostage taking, 13 proliferation and use of nuclear
Whitaker, Iraq stands alone as Arab world offers sympathy and regrets, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 13,
2001.
109. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (Sept. 12, 2001).
110. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,
20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Aircraft Convention 1963]; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter Seizures of Aircraft Convention 1970]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Civil
Aviation Convention 1971]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Diplomatic Agents Convention 1973]; International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages
Convention 1979]; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter Protection of Nuclear Material Convention 1980]; Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb.
24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627 [hereinafter Unlawful Acts of Violence Protocol 1988]; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M.
668, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Maritime Navigation Convention 1988]; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 685, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter Continental Shelf Protocol 1988];
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
721 (1991) [hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention 1991]; International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 249, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 (1998)
[hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention 1988]; International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) [hereinafter Terrorism Financing
Convention 1999]; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13,
2005, 44 I.L.M. 815 (2005) [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005].
111. Aircraft Convention 1963, supra note 110; Seizures of Aircraft Convention 1970, supra note
110; Maritime Navigation Convention 1988, supra note 110; Continental Shelf Protocol 1988, supra
note 110.
112. Civil Aviation Convention 1971, supra note 110; Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997, supra
note 110; Continental Shelf Protocol 1988, supra note 110; Plastic Explosives Convention 1991, supra
note 110; Unlawful Acts of Violence Protocol 1988, supra note 110; Maritime Navigation Convention
1988, supra note 110.
113. Diplomatic Agents Convention 1973, supra note 110; Hostages Convention 1979, supra note
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material,1 14 and financing, 115 states can avoid the thorny matter of affirming a
comprehensive definition that might tie their hands at a later stage. The closest
defintion is found in Article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, which suggests that terrorism is defined as (a)
anything covered by 9 other conventions and protocols" 6 or
(b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities
in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act. 117
Notwithstanding copious resolutions on terrorism, the Security Council has
never promulgated a definition, instead referring to the same "international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism." 118 Ambassador Greenstock, as
Chair of the Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) solved the problem of
definition as follows: "[f]or the Committee, terrorism is what the members of the
Committee decide unanimously is terrorism."' 1 9 To crudely paraphrase: "terrorism
is what we say it is."
Fortunately, it is not crucial for the purposes of this paper that the present
author provide the definition that every state can agree upon; one that has to date
eluded 192 members of the United Nations and tens of thousands of scholars of
international law. Since the rules of state responsibility are, according to the ILC,
matters of secondary rules, it should not be necessary, for their examination, to
provide a precise and conclusive definition of the primary rules to which they
attach. 1
20
B. The Council's Counter-Terrorism Resolutions and State Responsibility
The authority of the Council and the status of its resolutions vis d vis other
sources of international law has been extensively debated, with a particular flurry
114. Protection of Nuclear Material Convention 1980, supra note 110; Nuclear Terrorism
Convention 2005, supra note 110.
115. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110.
116. Id. art. 2, annex. Excluded are the Aircraft Convention 1963, supra note 110; Plastic
Explosives Convention 1991, supra note 110; Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005, supra note 110.
117. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110, art 2. For a review of various
definitions to be found in international instruments and their strengths and weaknesses, see HELEN
DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-29 (2005); see also
Antonio Cassese, Terrorism as an International Crime, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS
AGAINST TERRORISM 213,214,219 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004).
118. E.g., S.C. Res. 1566, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 1982).
119. Andrew Clapham, Terrorism, National Measures and International Supervision, in
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 117, at 283, 296-97.
120. On the distinction between primary and secondary rules, see Robert Ago, Second Report on
State Responsibility: The Origin of International Responsibility, 7, delivered to the International Law
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, reprinted in [1970] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 177, 178, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add. 1 [hereinafter Ago: Second Report 1970]; see also infra text accompanying
notes 384-90.
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of literature discussing the anti-terrorism resolutions that followed the attacks of
2001 .121 The debate need not detain us here and for the purposes of this article, it
shall be assumed that the Council's counter-terrorism resolutions, taken under
Chapter VII, are binding on all United Nations member states. 122 The delicate
matter of respect for customary international law and the principles and purposes
of the Charter need not be further discussed as it is not necessary in order to
evaluate the Council's vision of state responsibility per se. 123 Indeed this must be
one of few articles to examine Council anti-terrorism measures and international
human rights law without investigating the potential for tensions between the
two. 
124
121. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901
(2002) (discussing Resolution 1370 as a possible harbinger of the Security Council's willingness to take
on a more commanding legislative role); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (2003) (focusing on the negative aspects of the Security Council's recent legislative
actions in three areas of international law); Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the
Constitution of the United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 593 (2003) (positing that the Security Council,
in passing Resolution 1373, acted beyond the scope of its designated authority); Roberto Lavalle, A
Novel, ifAwkward, Exercise in International Law-Making: Security Council Resolution 1540, 51 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 411 (2004) (comparing the legislative qualities of Resolution 1540 against its legislative
predecessor, Resolution 1373); Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 537 (2004) (discussing the impact of the Council's Resolutions on the role of states as the
major source of protection against terrorism); Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global
Legislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542 (2005) (arguing that the
Council's legislative resolutions are innovative, within the ambit of the U.N. Charter's grant of power
to the Security Council, and they are necessary tools to combat modern terrorism); TARCISIO GAZztNI,
THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-14 (2005) (discussing broadly
the legal bases for Security Council resolutions and the extent of their authority); Andrea Bianchi,
Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council's Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for
Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 881 (2006) (evaluating the correlation between the
perceived legitimacy of the measures and the extent to which states have implemented them). For a pre-
2001 review of the "law-making" authority of the Council, see Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Security
Council's "Law-Making ", 83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 609 (2000).
122. On the legal force of the resolutions, see U.N. Charter arts. 24-25, 103; Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 53-54 (June 21) [hereinafter
Namibia Advisory Opinion]; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126 (Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of
the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 3, 14-15 (Apr. 14); GAZZINI, supra note 121, at
14; PETER J. VAN KRIEKEN, TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 111-12 (2002);
Happold, supra note 121, at 597; Rosand, supra note 121, at 574. For arguments that the legal force of
the Resolutions has been improperly expanded, see Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra, at 291-95, 339-
40 (dissenting opinions of Judge Fitzmaurice and Judge Gros); Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, at 708-
11.
123. See U.N. Charter, art. 24, 2; E.J. Flynn, The Security Council's Counter- Terrorism
Committee and Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 371, 374-76 (2007) (referencing adherence to
human rights norms as one of the principles and purposes of the Charter that reinforces the strength of
anti-terrorism resolutions). See generally Rosemary Foot, The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and
Human Rights: InstitutionalAdaptation and Embedded Ideas, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 489 (2007).
124. For a recent examination of this topic, see generally SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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The distinct issues of state responsibility for terrorist attacks and the right to
use self-defense against such attacks ought not to be conflated. 125 The legality of
intervention in Afghanistan following the attacks of September 1 1th should not be
confused with the matter of whether Afghanistan is "responsible" for those
attacks. 1
26
One can envisage circumstances were state responsibility is not in question
(for example, de jure state agents have committed a "terrorist-like" attack), but the
right to use of force in self-defense does not automatically follow. There is no
right to resort to force, for example, if the gravity of the attack is not sufficiently
serious to reach the threshold of an "armed attack.' '127 Further, there will be no
legitimate self-defense in the absence of an ongoing imminent threat of further
attacks. 128 Further, even in simple cases of self-defense against an armed attack by
one state against another, the limitations of proportionality and necessity remain
crucial. 129 A no-holds-barred saturation bombing campaign would be unlikely to
meet the tests of necessity and proportionality and thus be illegal. Simply put, a
"terrorist" attack, even by a state, does not provide carte blanche for all and any
measures of self-defense.
On the other hand, there is considerable debate about whether state
responsibility is a pre-requisite for the legality of self-defense measures against
purported terrorists residing in another state's territory (a host state). There is no
textual reason to suggest that an "armed attack" in the sense of Article 51 must be
by a state. On the other hand, state practice and opinio juris, particularly prior to
the September 1 1 th attacks, point to the opinion that state responsibility is a pre-
requisite for the legality of any incursion on the territory of the sovereign host
state. The arguments for and against each view will not be repeated here. 13°
(Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007) (containing a collection of essays scrutinizing the
relationship between security and human rights from a multidisciplinary perspective). See also Bianchi,
supra note 121, at 885-87, 905-14.
125. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 375 (1963).
126. See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 999 (2001).
127. Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 103-04.
128. Armed "reprisals" are precluded; see Declaration on the Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, para. 6 (1st princ.), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc.
A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]. Gazzini provides examples of
measures that appear like reprisals in the counter-terrorism context. However, in these cases, the states
all claim some other legal justification for their action, and thus there is no opinio juris to support a
change in customary international law. See GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 203-04; see also CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 163-64 (2d ed. 2004).
129. Carsten Stahn, Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001): What They Say and
What They Do Not Say, EUR. J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE
CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES 13-16 (Oct. 12, 2001), http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:
GEsWRgr99D4J:www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-stahn.pdf+Carsten+Stahn+AND+Security+Council+
Resolution+ 1368+(200 1)+and+I 373+(2001 ):+What+They+Say+and+What+They+Do+Not+Say (last
visited Sept. 21,2008). See also GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 192-94; GRAY, supra note 128, at 167.
130. For an excellent and concise discussion of the competing arguments with evidence of
customary international law and commentators in support of each, see TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND
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The Council did nothing to help clarify the matter in its hastily agreed
Resolution 1368 of September 12 th 2001.131 Whilst in the preamble "recognizing
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the
Charter," nowhere do they use the term "armed attack" which, "in accordance with
the Charter," is an essential prerequisite to self-defense.,32 The terrorist attacks of
September 1 1th are instead "regard[ed]... like any act of international terrorism, as a
threat to international peace and security.' ' 133 Threats to international peace and
security, of course, justify invocation of Chapter VII powers, even to the extent of
using force in the absence of any actual or purported violation of international law
by the target state.134 They do not automatically authorize the use of force absent
Security Council approval; under the Charter, only an "armed attack" can.
135
THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 158-62 (2006). Those maintaining the
view that state responsibility is a sine qua non for the legality of the use of force in self-defense include
Cassese, supra note 126, at 996-97; Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense was There an "'Armed Attack"? EUR.
J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, at
http://www.ejil.org/forumWTC/ny-gaja.html (visited Aug. 7, 2007); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Law
After the Destruction of the Twin Towers, EUR. J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: THE ATTACK ON THE
WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, at http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-dupuy.html
(visited Aug. 23, 2007). See generally Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State
Responsibility and the Use of Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 97 (2003); lain Scobbie, Words my
Mother Never Taught Me_ "In Defense of the International Court, " 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 76 (2005). They
find support in, inter alia, Nicaragua, supra note 2; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter
Palestinian Wall opinion]. Arguing for the right to use force in self-defense against terrorists regardless
of state responsibility are BROWNLIE, supra note 125, at 375; Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the
Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839, 840 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJAdvisory Opinion
on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 52, 58 (2005). These
authors defend their argument with references to, inter alia, recent practice of the Council, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, and opinio juris in support of Israel
following the Palestinian Wall opinion. See also BECKER, supra, at 159-62; GRAY, supra note 128, at
159. Gazzini takes the view that prior to September 11 th, the former view prevailed. Since then, the
real issue has become, not the legality of self-defense against non-state terrorist actors per se, but the
restrictions and conditions to be placed on the exercise of self-defense once a state has determined to
pursue such a course. See GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 139, 190-97. Gray agrees that prior to
September 11 th use of force in self-defense was only justified to the extent that the host state was
responsible. However, she does not consider there to be enough evidence to decide that customary
international law has since evolved to definitively allow self-defense against actors whose actions are
disconnected from the state in which they reside. See GRAY, supra note 128, at 164-67; see also
Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 602-
03 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
131. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
132. See id. See also U.N. Charter art. 51; Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private
Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 83, 85 n.8 (noting that in previous Resolutions, the Council has
explicitly referred to an "armed attack" when invoking the right of self-defense).
133. S. C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 1.
134. GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 7-8; Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, at 632.
135. U.N. Charter art. 51; but see GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 123-24 (arguing that there is a new,
post-Charter customary law on the use of force with a threshold for self-defense below that of an armed
attack).
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Acts of terrorism had been recognized as potential threats to international
peace and security and triggering Chapter VII powers in previous resolutions on
terrorism, with reference to Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan. 136 However, none of
these made reference to self-defense. At best, Chapter VI Res. 731 on Libya
affirms a state's right "to protect their nationals from acts of international terrorism
that constitute threats to international peace and security."
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The Council recognized in Resolution 748 the Charter preclusion of the threat
or use of force which indicates that: "every State has the duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force. 138
Any state assisting terrorists or "'acquiescing" to terrorist activities will hence
be in violation of Article 2(4)."' But in Resolution 1368 the Security Council
seems to go further and "[c]alls on all States to work together urgently to bring to
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and
stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable. 14 °
"Those responsible" appears in the French text as the rather less concise "ceux
que portent la responsabilit" with "held accountable" appearing as "rendre des
comptes".141 There is a hint of tautology in Resolution 1368's insistence that
"those responsible [for aiding, supporting or harboring terrorists]... will be held
accountable." It is not specified for what exactly harboring states shall be held
accountable -whether solely for their actions in harboring the terrorists or whether
for any resulting terrorist attacks. The latter would leave them open, should a
terrorist attack reach the threshold of an "armed attack," to lawful use of force in
self-defense against their own institutions. Furthermore, the use of "those" is
broad enough to be interpreted as referring to non-state actors who shall be held
accountable by states in domestic judicial process. At the time this Resolution was
passed, it should be recalled that it was far from clear who was behind the attacks.
The Council, in the heat of September 12 th
, also "[e]xpresse[d] its readiness to
take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
136. S.C. Res. 748, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992); S.C. Res. 1054, pmbl. paras. 8-
11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1054 (Apr. 26, 1996); S.C. Res. 1070, pmbl. paras. 7,10, 12, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1070 (Aug. 16, 1996); S.C. Res. 1267, pmbl., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C.
Res. 1333, pmbl., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); see also Chapter VI resolutions
including S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992); S.C. Res. 1044, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1044
(Jan. 31, 1996); S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999).
137. S.C. Res. 731, supra note 136, pmbl. para. 2.
138. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 136, pmbl. para. 6. See also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Friendly
Relations Declaration, supra note 128, para. 6 (1st princ.); Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 22;
Nicaragua case, supra note 2, 195, at 104.
139. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
140. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 3.
141. R~solution du Conseil de s~curit6 1368, 3, Nations Unies Document S/RES/1368 (12
Septembre 2001), available at http://www.un.org/french/ga/search/viewdoc.asp?symbo=S/RES/1368
(2001).
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and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under
the Charter of the United Nations. 142
"All necessary steps" is well known code for the use of force. However, with
a little over two weeks to allow the initial shock to subside and during which to
bear witness to the US-led coalition's preparations for war in Afghanistan, the
Council in Resolution 1373 demonstrates a little less "readiness" to take its own
measures. 143  The preamble reaffirms "the need to combat by all means... in
accordance with the Charter" international terrorism, but the Council stops short of
indicating that it is willing to take all necessary steps to that end. It is, however,
prepared to take "all necessary steps" to ensure compliance with the Resolution, a
quite extraordinary statement given the extensive demands on all United Nations
member states contained within. 144
The "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" is again alluded
to in the preamble of the Resolution, but no explicit authorization is given for the
attacks that followed against Afghanistan, even though by this time they were a
foregone conclusion. 145 Nowhere does the term "armed attack" appear, as had been
the case in other resolutions authorizing the use of force, nor is Afghanistan named
as an appropriate target.146 It certainly does not preclude the use of force by the
US and its allies and, of course, such a thing would have been unthinkable given
the veto powers of the United States and its loyal ally, the United Kingdom. The
ambiguity can be explained in at least two ways: on the one hand, it may be that
some states were uncomfortable with the implications for the rules of attribution
and state responsibility of giving the terrorist attacks the status of "armed attacks"
and indicating Afghan responsibility for the same. 147 On the other hand, and at
least as probable, is that the United States and its allies on the Council did not wish
to be limited in their response to only Afghanistan. Should it transpire that other
states were engaged in some way in the attacks or were planning or sheltering the
planners of future attacks, the coalition would not have to obtain further Council
authorization for action against those states. In any case, the verbatim record is
manifestly unhelpful as the meeting lasted an astonishing five minutes, with time
only for the unanimous vote and no state remarks. 148 Whatever discussions were
held between the Council members were held off-the-record.
Resolution 1373 has been described as "legislative" and indeed, it
demonstrates features normally associated with legislation. 49 Most significantly,
142 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 5.
143. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
144. Id 8.
145. Id. pmbl. para. 4.
146. See Jinks, supra note 132, at 85 n.8.
147. See Stahn, supra note 129, at 4-8.
148. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4385 (Sept. 28, 2001).
149. E.g., Szasz, supra note 121, at 905; Alvarez, supra note 121, at 874; Happold, supra note 121,
at 595; Lavalle, supra note 121, at 414-15; Rosand, supra note 121, at 552. See also Eric Rosand,
Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter- Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333,334 (2003).
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it is addressed to every member state of the United Nations and concerns itself
with a whole genre of behavior, rather than a specifically identified threat. It is
thus a general prescription of conduct to all member states, rather than a
specifically targeted executive order directed to a particularly mischievous state
that is thought to pose a threat to international peace and security. Further, it is
without limit of time.
In its generality it thus differs significantly from the pre-September 2001
efforts to deter the Taliban, the purported but largely unrecognized Government of
Afghanistan, from "sheltering and training" terrorists.1 50  The Council had
instituted sanctions against the regime, monitored by a dedicated committee
(commonly known as the 1267 committee), to try to bring pressure on the Taliban
to extradite Usama Bin Laden. 151 Resolution 1267 and its follow-ups place
obligations on all member states to respect the sanctions, but they are aimed at a
specific threat, a specific manifestation of terrorism, not terrorism in general.
152
By contrast, Resolution 1269 is directed against terrorism more generally, but,
taken under Chapter VI, it contains only recommendations, not binding
obligations. 
153
The operative paragraphs of Resolution 1373 introduce a number of
obligations for states and create the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)
consisting of one representative of each Council member to monitor compliance. 1
54
The Council "[d]ecides that states shall" prevent the funding of terrorism by
criminalizing provision or collection of funds, freezing existing funds and
prohibiting the donation of funds. 155 Further, "all states shall" refrain from giving
any support, "active or passive," to terrorist groups; suppress recruitment and arms
transfers to terrorists; 156 share information, including giving "early warnings" to
other states; "[d]eny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens"; prevent the same from operating in their
territories; ensure adequate criminal law and its application against terrorists, their
financiers and supporters; cooperate in exchange of intelligence to this end; and
prevent their free movement. 157
States are requested ("call[ed] upon") to exchange pertinent information, to
cooperate in matters of criminal justice, to ensure that asylum systems are not
abused by participants in terrorism and to ratify pertinent Conventions, in
particular, the Terrorism Financing Convention.1 58  The Council "[n]otes with
concern" connections between international terrorism and other international
150. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 136, pmbl. para. 6.
151. Id. 6.
152. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 136, pmbl. paras. 10-14; S.C. Res. 1377, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
153. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 136.
154. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 6.
155. Id. 11.
156. Compare Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 128, para. 6 (1st princ.).
157. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 2.
158. Id. 3; see Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110.
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crimes, such as illegal trafficking in drugs, arms and nuclear material (though not
persons), and money laundering, and although emphasizing the need for
cooperation, does not actually mandate it. 1
59
The subject matter does not differ radically from Resolution 1269 of October
1999, and Peter J. Van Krieken has argued that Resolution 1373 is a natural
progression from the earlier resolution, rather than indicative of a change in
direction by the Council.160 However, Resolution 1269 is a non-binding Chapter
VI resolution which "calls upon" states to "consider" ratification of anti-terrorism
conventions, as well as applying fully those to which they are party.' 61 They are
asked to take "appropriate steps" to: cooperate with one another to prevent and
suppress terrorism, including by limiting preparation and financing of activities;
deny "safe haven" and ensure prosecution and extradition of those involved; take
"appropriate measures" to limit asylum to terrorists; and exchange information that
can help prevent terrorist acts being committed. 62 This is considerably milder than
Chapter VII Resolution 1373 by virtue of which the Council "decides" that states
"shall" take a number of measures. The suggested measures are given much less
detail in the former resolution, allowing states a broader discretion in their
implementation as well as a choice as to whether they will implement the
recommendations at all.
Resolution 1373's focus on financing of terrorism might have appeared
strange had it not been for the earlier International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism. 163 This meant that the Council members had some
ready-prepared provisions that could be easily adopted, enabling the Council to act
quickly. 164 Nevertheless, in September 2001, that Convention was far from being
in force, having as parties only Botswana, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom and
Uzbekistan. 165  Moreover, whilst introducing, indeed mandating, the counter-
terrorism provisions of this treaty for all member states, despite the fact that only
one Council member had ratified it, they also neglected to include the safety-net
provisions in the Convention for the benefit of suspects. 166 The "alleged offender"
of the Convention loses the presumption, or at least possibility, of innocence to
become simply the "person[] involved in terrorist acts" in the Council
Resolution. 1
67
159. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 4.
160. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 136; VAN KRIEKEN, supra note 122, at 144.
161. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 136, 2.
162. Id.14.
163. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110.
164. Compare id. art. 2(1), with S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 1 (b). Compare id. art. 8(1), with
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 1(c). Compare id art. 14, with S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143,
3(g).
165. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Appendix Xll: U. N. Conventions on
Terrorism, INVENTORY OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIMES 2002,
at 358-63 (Nov. 19, 2007), http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmunter.pdf.
166. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110, arts. 9(3)-(6), 17; see also Bianchi,
supra note 121, at 914-15; Alvarez, supra note 121, at 875-78.
167. Compare Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110, art. 3, with S.C. Res. 1373,
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Lavalle reminds us that whatever the contents and authority of the norms of
Council 1373, it is not a treaty and, therefore, the customary law of treaty
interpretation, including the Vienna Convention, does not apply.'
68
The overwhelming majority of states, perhaps apprehensive from events
earlier that month, silently accepted the Resolution. Compliance, at least formally,
has since been extraordinary, with every United Nations member state submitting
the requisite initial report (an achievement that must be greatly envied by the
human rights treaty bodies) and scrambling to ratify the relevant treaties) 69 Cuba
was a rare voice at the General Assembly expressing concern about the
constitutional implications of the Council's "lawmaking:"
The Security Council has been pushed to give its legal support to the
hegemonic and arbitrary decisions of the dominant Power. Those
decisions violate the Charter and international law and encroach upon
the sovereignty of all States. In this, the Council is once again usurping
the functions of the General Assembly, which is the only organ whose
universal membership and democratic format could legitimize such far-
reaching decisions. The Council uses the unusual method of imposing
on all States some of the provisions found in the conventions against
terrorism, to which individual States have the right to decide whether or
not they wish to be signatories.1
70
Resolution 1373 introduces for all states obligations of conduct rather than
obligations of result. 171 States are required to take certain, quite specific measures.
If they fail to do so, they will be responsible for their failure; to the extent that the
Council even threatens to take "'all necessary steps" against them.1 72  If a state
should take these measures and some funds still reach terrorists within its
jurisdiction, the state will have satisfied the requirements of due diligence and will
not engage responsibility as it will not have committed any "wrongful act., 1 73 On
supra note 143, 1 2(a). The CTC, having early on declared that human rights concerns were outside its
mandate, later proved more cooperative, and the Council introduced requirements that counter-terrorism
measures be respectful of human rights and humanitarian law in later resolutions. E.g., S.C. Res. 1456,
1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003); S.C. Res. 1624, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14,
2005). At the end of 2006, a system was introduced for delisting innocent persons from the sanctions
regime of the 1267 Committee. S.C. Res. 1735, IT 13-14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006). See
also BECKER, supra note 130, at 127-29. For a review of the CTC's engagement with human rights, see
Flynn, supra note 123.
168. Lavalle, supra note 121, at 418.
169. David Cortright, A Critical Evaluation of the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Program:
Accomplishments and Challenges 5-6, http://www.tni.org/crime-docs/cortright.pdf (last visited Sept.
20, 2008); see U.N. Secretariat, Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Concept Paper on the
High Commissioner's Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, at 19, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2
(Mar. 22, 2006).
170. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 13th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (Oct. 1, 2001) (speech
by Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla of Cuba).
171. See supra text accompanying note 92.
172. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 18.
173. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188, 1 430, at 294-95 (Feb. 26, 2007)
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the other hand, if a state fails to take these measures, even if no terrorist funding
occurs, it will still technically be in breach of the obligation. Responsibility does
not depend on actual terrorist financing, let alone any act of terrorism.
74
The ministerial level meeting of the 1 2th of November 2001, resulting in
Resolution 1377, reinforced the obligations of Resolution 1373.75 It also
empowered the CTC to consider ways to assist states in complying with the earlier
resolution.1 76  A number of resolutions follow relating to the 1267 sanctions
regime, variously extending the sanctions to be applied, reporting requirements to
the 1267 committee, and improving cooperation with the CTC. 177 Sanctions are
modestly eased in Resolution 1452 with regard to basic necessities and to pay
debts. 178 In January 2003, states, whilst reminded of their obligations, including
reporting obligations, are also advised to ensure compliance with international law,
including human rights. 179 Under pressure from some European states, a system
for "delisting" innocent persons from the sanctions regime of 1267 was finally
introduced in December 2006.18°
The Madrid bombings in 2004 were followed by the disastrous Resolution
1530 which, under pressure from the Spanish Government, explicitly attributed
blame to ETA, despite a paucity of evidence indicating their involvement. 181 The
mistake was not repeated after the London bombings 16 months later.'
82
The CTC was restructured and strengthened by Resolution 1535 and this
move was followed by another "legislative" effort of the Council in Resolution
1540, this time introducing obligations on states to deny assistance to any non-state
actors attempting to develop or otherwise obtain biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons.1 3 States are also required to review and, if necessary, amend or enforce
their domestic laws to prevent non-state actors handling such weapons.' 84 Non-
proliferation measures must be increased (also, it would appear, in respect of
states) regardless of member states' ratification of or accession to relevant non-
[hereinafter Genocide Convention case].
174. See Ago: Second Report 1970, supra note 120, at 194-95. Damage will be relevant to the
availability of remedies, in particular, in identifying an "injured state" in light of ILC Articles 42 and
48. ILC Articles, supra note 4, arts. 42, 48, at 54, 56.
175. S.C. Res. 1377, supra note 152.
176. Id. annex paras. 13-15.
177. S.C. Res. 1390, 77 I to 2(a)-(c), U.N. Doe. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455, 77 1,
3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526, 77 1-3, 10, 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526
(Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1617, 71 1, 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1735, supra
note 167, 7 1, 29.
178. S.C. Res. 1452, 77 1-2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002).
179. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 167, 1 6.
180. S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 167,I 13-14.
181. S.C. Res. 1530, 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1530 (Mar. 11, 2004); see also Therese O'Donnell,
Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004), 17 EUR. J. INT'L L.
945, 946 (2007).
182. S.C. Res. 1611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1611 (July 7, 2005).
183. S.C. Res. 1535, IT 1-3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1540, 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); see also Lavalle, supra note 121, at 416.
184. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 7 2.
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proliferation treaties. 185 Another committee was established, which will receive
mandatory reports from states on compliance. 186 The Council has become a little
less belligerent since Resolution 1373 and, rather than "express[ing] its
determination to take all necessary steps," this time more modestly "expresses its
intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the
appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end."'1
87
This time, the constitutional issues did not go unremarked and a number of
states expressed concerns about the propriety of the Council taking this kind of
action.1 88 Nevertheless, after the fact, they complied. 189
The CTC is authorized to make state visits, with state consent, in Resolution
1566.190 This Resolution is also worth considering for its reiteration of the
Council's interpretation of state obligations vis d vis terrorism, as it:
Calls upon States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism,
especially with those States where or against whose citizens terrorist
acts are committed, in accordance with their obligations under
international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice,
on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who
supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the
financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or
provides safe havens.
191
September 2005 witnessed Resolution 1624's expansion of the counter-
terrorism mission to preventing the "glorification of terrorist acts" and, albeit with
a nod to human rights, in particular the right of free speech, calls upon states to
prohibit and prevent "incitement" to terrorism.1 92 States are also called upon to
improve passenger screening in international transport.' 93 The Council again seeks
to establish an international norm for the entire international community, although,
by "calling upon" rather than "deciding.. .that States shall," there is not the same
legislative air - the Council is "asking nicely" rather than demanding compliance
from states.
C. Who is the State? Counter-terrorism Obligations and Responsibility of States
The Council's counter-terrorism resolutions do not provide an unambiguous
view of state responsibility. Not for the first time, precision is a casualty of the
veto power. There are, however, at least three possible interpretations that can be
drawn from the post-2001 resolutions. The first is uncontroversial; the second, in
185. Id. 3; but see U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 2-5, U.N. Doe. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28,
2004) (speech by Mr. Akram of Pakistan regarding the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540).
186. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183,74.
187. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 8; S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 11.
188. Lavalle, supra note 121, at 426-28.
189. Id. at 428.
190. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 118, 8.
191. Id. 2.
192. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 167, pmbl. paras. 5, 7, 1.
193. Id 2.
2008
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
this author's opinion, engages little controversy; the third is sufficiently
controversial to remain unproven.
1. States must refrain from interference with the sovereign affairs of other
states, including by supporting, inter alia, terrorist actors
The obligation of states to respect the sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity of one another is a central pillar of international law. This
principle can be found in the Charter194 and in the Friendly Relations Declaration:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging
the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including
mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
195
Today, widely accepted as a description of customary international law, the
second of these paragraphs was replicated with approval in the Preambles to
Council Resolutions 748 and 1373.196
According to the classical understanding, the state is thus responsible for
providing any assistance or support to terrorists, but not for any resulting terrorists
attacks themselves. Responsibility depends on the dependence and control tests of
ILC Articles 4 & 8, Nicaragua, and now the Genocide Convention case. The
international wrong is the positive action of the state in providing support; this
may, depending on the circumstances, reach the threshold of "indirect aggression",
but it will not constitute an "armed attack." As a negative obligation, i.e. a duty to
abstain, due diligence is irrelevant; it is nonsense to talk about doing one's best not
to do something. States must simply not do it.197 The question of whether the
Council has instigated a stronger doctrine of responsibility, that is, responsibility
for the terrorist acts themselves, will be addressed shortly.
2. States must exercise due diligence to prevent terrorism and protect others
Breaches of positive obligations are recognized as giving rise to responsibility
in ILC Article 12.198 According to this, it is irrelevant whether the obligation
emanates from treaty, customary international law, or even Council resolution. In
the commentary to this article, Council resolutions are not amidst the examples
proffered by the ILC. 199  However, the ILC did not purport to provide an
exhaustive list.
200
194. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
195. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 128, paras. 8-9 (1st princ.).
196. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 136; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143.
197. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 31-33.
198. ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 12, at 46.




Long recognized is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States," as held in the
first judgment of the post-Charter Court.20 1 Therefore, the state has a positive
obligation to prevent terrorist activities being organized within its territory. This
obligation is subject to the requirements of due diligence. 20 2 Ago explains that
where the state does not act with due diligence:
the Government of that State will be accused of having failed to fulfil
its international obligations with respect to vigilance, protection and
control, of having failed in its specific duty not to tolerate the
preparation in its territory of actions which are directed against a
foreign Government or which might endanger the latter's security, and
so on.
20 3
As already noted, the degree of diligence due, or the standard of care, expected of a
state varies depending on the primary rule in play.
20 4
The Council's resolutions, in particular 1373, 1540, and 1566 would indicate
that the standards of care, that is, the degree of diligence due, are higher for
terrorism today than prior to 2001.205 There has, therefore, been a change in the
primary rules, without necessarily indicating a change in the secondary rules of
attributability. The state (still identified per Nicaragua) remains responsible for
failing to take adequate measures to prevent terrorist acts, but the measures
expected of the state are more stringent than before. A failure to meet these
(higher) standards would constitute a separate delict and it is for this delict, rather
than the terrorist attack itself, that the state is responsible. Furthermore, by
introducing obligations of (diligent) conduct, state responsibility depends solely on
the state's action or inaction and does not require any actual terrorist attack.20 6
Ago's 1970 report explains that:
There have been innumerable cases in which States have been held
responsible for damage caused by individuals. As will be shown later,
these alleged cases of State responsibility for the acts of individuals are
really cases of responsibility of the State for omissions by its organs: the
State is responsible for having failed to take appropriate measures to
prevent or punish the individual's act.
20 7
This is to say that the state has not been held responsible for the actions of the
individuals as though they were the state's own; the non-state behavior is not
attributed to the state. The state instead is only responsible for its separate delict
201. Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 22.
202. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 34-36.
203. Roberto Ago, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, [1972] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 70, 120
135, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
205. Compare S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 3, and S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 1-3, and
S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 118, 2, with S.C. Res. 748, supra note 136, 4-6.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
207. Ago: Second Report 1970, supra note 120, 35, at 188.
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(the omission of its organs). As in genocide, where omission is the basis for
responsibility, there is no need to identify a state organ or agent according to
Nicaragua or any other standard.2 °8
Pisillo-Mazzeschi confirmed this interpretation in 1992. "[T]he conduct of
tolerance is not an act of aggression but only a breach of the autonomous rule of
customary law, which binds the State to prevent, in its territory, the organization of
acts of force against foreign States.,
209
State responsibility in Corfu Channel hinged on such a separate delict,
210
specifically, the failure to warn shippers of the dangers of which Albania was
deemed to have been aware.211
It thus appears that the primary rules determining the degree of due diligence
to prevent terrorism have changed. But it remains possible that the secondary rules
of attribution have also changed and that Ago's and Pisillo-Mazzeschi's views
have been superceded. This latter possibility will now be considered.
3. States bear responsibility for injuries caused by non-state terrorist actors
Some recent scholarship has argued both descriptively and prescriptively that
states should be held accountable, i.e. engage full international responsibility, for
the acts of terrorists whom they support or harbor without the need to establish a
connection meeting the Nicaragua test, but depending on a causation test or even
strict liability.212 Savarese has argued more modestly that the failure of due
diligence in the context of terrorism, when followed by a specific terrorist attack,
could be characterized as "complicity" albeit in a non-technical sense ("complicita;
213
sia pure solo in senso atecnico"). However, this would not square with the
Court's reading of complicity, which it considered equivalent to "aid or assistance
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act" and requiring some positive
214
action on the part of state organs or agents. The arguments in support of these
positions are not based solely on the Council resolutions that have been the focus
of this paper, but also engage with other evidence of usus and opinio juris, in
particular, the invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. It should thus be
recalled that the Council has been considerably less forthright than the hegemonic
power in its exposition of the rules of attribution. The President of the United
States of America, immediately following the terrorist attacks on that country, but
208. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
209. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 36.
210. "Separate delict" is equivalent to "different wrongful act" as used by Pisillo-Mazzeschi, id. at
26.
211. Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 22.
212. E.g., BECKER, supra note 130, chs. 8-9; Alvarez, supra note 121, at 879; Vincent-Jodl Proulx,
Babysitting Terrorists: Should States be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 615 (2005).
213. Eduardo Savarese, Fatti di Privati e Responsabiliti dello Stato tra Organo di Fatto e
complicita" alla luce di Recenti Tendenze della Prassi Internazionale, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA
RESPONSABILITA INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI ALLA PROVA DE FATTi., supra note 37, at 53, 66.




before the identification of any likely perpetrators, insisted that the country would
make "no distinction between the terrorists who committed the attacks and those
who harbor them."215 The paucity of international responses to this incredible
statement must at least in part be attributed to the political atmosphere of the
moment and a reluctance to appear in any way apologetic for the thousands killed.
It would be dangerous, in this author's view, to read too much into one
example of intervention in Afghanistan by a group of strong states against a very
weak state at an emotionally and politically charged moment in World history.
216
It might also prove short-sighted to depend too heavily on any opinio juris of states
in that now notorious second week of September 2001. The Council resolutions,
on the other hand, particularly 1373 and 1540 creating, as they do, obligations on
states without limit of time, create a more lasting legacy. These resolutions might
be interpreted to support a theory of state responsibility for acts of terrorism by
non-state actors; at least they do not exclude such an interpretation. However,
such an interpretation is by no means the only reasonable one.
Resolution 1368 can certainly be reasonably interpreted as indicating an
21explicit assertion of state responsibility for harboring terrorists. 17 But it is
inadequate to determine whether responsibility is engaged for the terrorist acts
themselves or for some lesser wrong of wrongful interference. Invocation of the
collective right to self-defense, in Resolutions 1368 and 1373 can also be
understood as implicitly indicating state responsibility, at least if one takes the
view that only a state can commit an "armed attack" and that the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001 was accordingly lawful.
On the other hand, the preamble to Resolution 1373 repeats only the
customary norm that states must "refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in terrorist acts... or acquiescing" in such in its territory. Operative
paragraph 2, which details examples of what this means in practice, does not go
any further in indicating direct state responsibility for the results of failure.218
Even the Council's threat of "all necessary steps" to ensure compliance does not
logically require state responsibility of any particular form, since the Council's
considerable powers to take measures to ensure international peace and security do
not depend on any actual violation of international law.219
Resolution 1540 indicates a number of positive obligations upon states, but all
of these can be considered within the context of a duty to take measures to prevent
injuries caused by terrorism to the standards of due diligence.22°  State
responsibility would thus be based on a separate delict - taking inadequate
215. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation, (Sept. 11,
2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html; see also U.N. SCOR,
56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (Sept. 12, 2001).
216. C.f Nicaragua, supra note 2, 186 (noting that customary international law has room for
exceptions).
217. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 3.
218. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 2.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
220. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 3.
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measures - rather than for any terrorist attack. Therefore, the identity of the actors
as organs or agents is irrelevant.
The Resolutions, taken together, are insufficient to determine a change in the
secondary rules of state responsibility. It is one possible interpretation, but the
more plausible interpretation is that they do not.
D. The Impact of the Council on State Responsibility for Terrorism
The Council is clearly purporting to change the norms of international law,
whether it be primary or secondary rules. If it is authorized to change either, it is
authorized to change both. There is no reason why the "rules of change" in
international law should differ depending on whether primary or secondary rules
are at stake.
If we agree only that states permitting terrorists to operate in their territory
violate a separate (positive) obligation, then there is no change to the secondary
rules of international law; instead, only the standard of due diligence has been
strengthened, that is, the content of the primary rules. On the other hand, if it is to
be accepted that states harboring terrorists are to be considered responsible for the
results of terrorist activities, even in the absence of a de jure connection, complete
dependence, or effective control, then we must accept that the secondary rules of
international law have been amended as far as responsibility for terrorism is
concerned. This would indicate that responsibility for terrorism is lex specialis, as
facilitated by Article 55 of the ILC Articles.
In this latter case we are then lead back to the broader question of whether the
Council has the authority to create such a derogation in the pursuit of international
peace and security. If the Council can, should, and does create international law
binding on every member state, what are the implications of this for the consensual
basis of international law? These questions have been addressed elsewhere and
views range across the spectrum. Eric Rosand claims that the Council certainly
does have this authority and, moreover, there is no contradiction with the
consensual theory of international law as member states have consented to this
power by virtue of the Charter. 2 1 By contrast, Happold argues that legislative
behavior in the Council is both ultra vires and most undesirable, undermining as it
does "sovereign equality" of states and the Charter principles.
222
The Charter is both treaty and constitution of the United Nations. As the
latter, it is a living document and its norms may be subject to modification by
customary international law.223 In this context, it is possible that the broad
acceptance by states of the Council's "legislative" behavior indicates a shift in
customary international law. The evidence is inconclusive. At best, compliance
with the legislative features of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 indicate adequate state
221. Rosand, supra note 121, at 574; see U.N. Charter arts. 24, 25, 48, 103; see also Bianchi, supra
note 121, at 888-92 (arguing in favor of the Council's "legislative" actions on the basis of a kind of
international state of emergency); Szasz, supra note 121, at 901.
222. Happold, supra note 121, at 607-10; see also Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, at 690.
223. Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
607, 614-15 (2003); Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, 689-91.
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practice and opinio juris, albeit with Cuba as persistent objector.224 However, this
is probably too bold a claim, given the concerns raised by other states, including
examples from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, prior to the acceptance of
Resolution 1540.225 Certainly, it is too early to suggest that such a customary
international norm has yet crystallized, and further examples of both Council's
"legislation" and state acceptance of the same will be necessary before such a
determination can confidently be made.
On the other hand, the overwhelming acceptance of the primary norms on
counter-terrorism, originating in the Council's resolutions, indicate that customary
international law pertaining to state obligations regarding terrorism has now
changed, notwithstanding doubts over the authority of the Council to promulgate
such norms. In this latter case, it is not the authority of the Council that creates the
binding norm, but rather its later endorsement by states, in the form of usus and
opinio juris that creates the norm. This would imply not that the Council has the
power to make law, but only that it is has a strong influence on the development of
customary international law; its ultimate formation will depend on states'
behavior. 6
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES AND STATE
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT, PROTECT AND FULFILL HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Treaty Bodies
The seven human rights treaty bodies are as follows: the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), monitoring the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR);227 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR);228 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (Race Committee), monitoring the Convention for the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD);229 the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (Women's Committee), monitoring the
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW);23 ° the Committee Against Torture (Torture Committee), monitoring the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
224. See supra text accompanying note 170; see also U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 13th plen. mtg. at
14-16, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (Oct. 1, 2001) (speech by Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla of Cuba).
225. See supra notes 188-89; see generally Lavalle, supra note 121.
226. See Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, at 693.
227. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
228. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter ICESCRI. The monitoring Committee is not an original part of the Covenant, but was
established later by ECOSOC Res. 1985/17. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 1985/17,
7-8, 18, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1985/17 (May 28, 1985).
229. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 5 I.L.M. 352, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
230. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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Punishment (CAT);231 the Committee on the Rights of the Child (Children's
Committee), monitoring the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its
Optional Protocols 232 and the Committee on Migrant Workers (Migrant Workers'
Committee), monitoring the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC).233 Each of these receives and
considers reports of state parties and gives concluding comments or observations
following discussion with state representatives. They also make general comments
or general recommendations addressed to all states, with some committees being
considerably more prolific than others.234 The HRC, Race Committee, Women's
Committee and Torture Committee permit, subject to state consent, individual
communications, with the HRC receiving by far the bulk of these.235 The Migrant
Workers' Committee will also be able to hear communications once 10 states
accede to the procedure; as of September 2007, of 37 state parties, none had made
the requisite declaration.236
CAT contains provisions for state focused inquiries237 and the recently
established Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment will be authorized to make regular visits to
state parties to monitor conditions in detention of consenting state parties. 238 The
CEDAW Committee can also now undertake inquiries under its Optional
Protocol. 239  The Race Committee is not explicitly authorized by treaty to
undertake inquiries, but does have an early warning and urgent procedure, whereby
231. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
232. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC];
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000);
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000).
233. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, May 2, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1517 [hereinafter MWC]. One new body has be en
established by its convention, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006,
46 I.L.M. 443, and another new body will be created once its convention comes into force, the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res.
61/177, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
234. See U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/l/Rev.8 (May 8, 2006) [hereinafter
Compilation of General Comments].
235. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter OP-ICCPR]; CAT, supra note 231, art. 13; CERD, supra note
229, art. 14; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter OP-CEDAW].
236. MWC, supra note 233, art. 77.
237. CAT, supra note 231, art. 20. At the time of writing this procedure had been used on five
occasions.
238. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 11, Dec. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 26.
239. See OP-CEDAW, supra note 235, arts. 8-10.
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they make decisions and send letters to states when they have immediate concerns
that cannot wait until the timetabling of the next state report.2
40
CAT, the MWC, CERD and the ICCPR provide the opportunity for state
parties to complain to the respective monitoring treaty bodies about the poor
compliance of another state party.24' In the former two cases, the treaty body
considers the complaint; in the latter two, it should create an ad hoc Conciliation
Commission.242 CAT, CEDAW and the MWC also explicitly provide for
negotiation, followed by arbitration, to resolve disputes as to "interpretation or
application" of the Conventions and, failing to reach agreement, states can bring a
case before the International Court of Justice. 243 These inter-state complaint
244procedures had never, as of November 2007, been exercised by state parties.
The treaty bodies are in a peculiar position. They are created principally to
receive the state reports on which they are authorized to make "suggestions",
"general comments" or "general recommendations" in their annual reports to the
General Assembly and, in later treaties, also directly to state parties.2 45 They are
authorized to interpret the conventions and to identify violations.246 Even in the
individual communications procedures, they are authorized only to transmit
"views," not "opinions" or "judgments".247 Nevertheless, the interpretations of the
committees have had considerable influence on the understanding and application
248of the conventions.
240. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, Early-Warning Measures and Urgent Procedures,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/early-warning.htm#about (last visited Sept. 19, 2008)
(stating that the mechanism was adopted in 1993).
241. CAT, supra note 231, art. 21; MWC, supra note 233, art. 76; CERD, supra note 229, art. 11;
ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 41.
242. CAT, supra note 231, art. 21; MWC, supra note 233, art. 76; CERD, supra note 229, art. 12;
ICCPR, supra note 227, arts. 42-43.
243. CAT, supra note 231, art. 30; CEDAW, supra note 230, art. 29; MWC, supra note 233, art.
92. It should also be noted that under the Statute of the Court, any question of treaty interpretation or
purported failure of implementation can be brought before the Court, subject to general provisions on
state consent to its jurisdiction. Statute of the Court, supra note 5, art. 36.
244. Felice D. Gaer, A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body
System, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109, 118 n.43 (2007); see also Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies Complaints Procedures,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm#interstate (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
245. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 40(4); CERD, supra note 229, art. 9(2); CEDAW, supra note 230,
art. 21; CAT, supra note 231, art. 19; CRC, supra note 241, art. 45(d); MWC, supra note 233, art.
74(1).
246. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights
Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
247. CAT, supra note 231, art. 22(7); MWC, supra note 233, art. 77(7); OP-ICCPR, supra note
235, art. 5(3); OP-CEDAW, supra note 235, art. 7(3). The Race Committee is authorized to give
"suggestions and recommendations." CERD, supra note 229, art. 14(7)(b). The HRC now issues
"views" and CEDAW has taken to issuing "decisions," the latter suggesting a more legal process.
248. See Int'l L. Assoc., Comm. on Int'l Human Rights L. & Practice, Final Report on the Impact
of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Berlin Conference 2004, 1 175-182
(2004), http://web.abo.fi/instut/imr/research/seminars/ILA/Report.pdf.
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With reference to state responsibility regimes under these treaties the first
thing that must be noted is that they are, in fact, treaties. As such, to the extent that
the treaties themselves contain provisions that indicate particular modes of state
responsibility, they are lex specialis
2 49
Nevertheless, international human rights law, to which the treaty bodies are
major contributors, and the general rules of state responsibility in international law
do not exist in parallel universes. Article 50(1)(b) of the ILC Articles requires that
counter-measures do not compromise "obligations for the protection of
fundamental human rights," and the commentary to this Article cites both the
ICCPR and the ICESCR as examples of "elements of general international law" as
well as making reference to the CESCR's General Comment No. 8.250 The ILC
refers also to the ICCPR, with reference to articles 14, 15, 20 and 30, as well as
citing communications of the HRC in its commentary.2 The HRC responded to
the ILC Articles with a general comment dedicated to explaining their relevance
and application to the ICCPR.252 The treaty bodies' regimes are not self-contained
regimes in all respects.253
B. State Responsibility in the Eyes of the Treaty Bodies
It serves to examine some of the recent work of the treaty bodies to consider
the predominant visions of state responsibility that they have applied. What has
become apparent is an increasing reliance on the tertiary model of state
responsibility for human rights, that is, responsibility to respect human rights (do
no harm), to protect human rights (prevent harm by non-state actors) and to fulfill
human rights (guarantee minimums of wellbeing).25 4
249. ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 55 at 58.
250. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 50, T 7, at 335; ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, (Dec. 4, 1997), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 51. See also Malcolm D. Evans, State
Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights: Role and Realm, in ISSUES OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 139, 142 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice &
Dan Sarooshi eds., 2004).
251. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to arts. 14, 1 11; 15, 1 6 n.276; 20, 10 n.349, 30 1 13 n.476.
252. U.N. Hum. Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2lRev.1/Add.13 (May 29,
2004), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 233 [hereinafter HRC
General Comment No. 31].
253. See ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 55, 5, at 358; Int'l L. Comm'n, Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law:
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 1 174-93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi); Dominic McGoldrick, State Responsibility and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 161, 165, supra note 250; but see Evans, supra note 250, at
160 (arguing that state responsibility in human rights, per the European Court of Human Rights and
state responsibility in the ILC Articles are best considered "as operating in altogether different
realm[s]"). The arguments relating to the European regime are not, as will be argued, equally applicable
to the U.N. treaty bodies.
254. See Byrnes & Connors, supra note 3.
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This model traces its origins to Henry Shue and Asbjorn Eide in the mid
1980s.255 The extent to which each of the seven bodies engages with it varies and
can be seen most explicitly in the operation of the CESCR. The Torture
Committee, no doubt feeling the constraints of its text which clearly prioritizes
"state" torture, traditionally confined its concerns to the duty to respect. However,
in recent years, it has expanded its gaze to the duty to protect but has not seen
scope to consider duties to fulfill.25 6 The reasons for this shall be explored
below.257
Given the enormous volume of work of the treaty bodies, a workload with
which even they struggle to keep up, a select review of the treaty bodies' work
shall be provided to demonstrate their engagement with the tertiary model.258
The CESCR explicitly relied upon this scheme in 1999 to frame General
Comment No. 12 and it has appeared in every general comment issued by that
committee since.259 Moreover, the concluding comments on state reports clearly
255. Special Rapporteur, Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, 34-36, 112-
15, 167-81, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7,
1987). This tertiary system is followed by the African Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights. See,
e.g., Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. [SERAC] v. Nig., African Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights,
Commc'n. No. 155/96 (2001), available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr-doc/serac.pdf. The European
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognize positive duties
principally at the level of protection. See, e.g., X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 235, 239-40 (1985); A v. UK, App. No. 25599/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1998); Femandes v.
Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. 56
(2001); Morales v. Guatemala, 1999 Inter-Am. C.H.R. Series C, No. 63, TT 144, 191 (Nov. 19, 1999),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_63_ing.pdf. In this latter case, the
court bordered on recognizing a duty to fulfill the right to life to ensure one would "not be prevented
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence."
256. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 21 (Kathleen E. Mahoney &
Paul Mahoney eds., 1993); Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women's Human Rights
and Strategies for their Implementation, 21 BROOK J. INT'L L. 799, 847-48 (1996); see also Christine
Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 387, 390 (1999).
257. See infra text accompanying notes 327-29.
258. On volume of work, see Rachael Loma Johnstone, Cynical Savings or Reasonable Reform?
Reflections on a Single Unified U.N. Human Rights Treaty Body, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 178-81
(2007). A more thorough examination of the tertiary scheme in practice can be found in Rachael Loma
Johnstone, Feminist Influences on the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 28 HUM. RTS. Q.
148, 154-80 (2006) [hereinafter Johnstone: Feminist Influences].
259. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food (art. 11), 14, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 63,
66. See also ECOSOC, General Comment No. 13: The right to education (art. 13), 46, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/10 (Aug. 12, 1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at
71, 80; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health
(art. 12), 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999), reprinted in Compilation of General
Comments, supra note 234, at 86, 94; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11
and 12 of the Covenant), 25, U.N. Doc. 3/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003), reprinted in Compilation of
General Comments, supra note 234, at 105, 111; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 16: The equal right
of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (art. 3), 17-21, U.N.
Doc. E/C. 12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 2344,
at 122, 125-26; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the
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indicate that state parties are obliged to ensure human rights on all three levels.260
To give recent examples, concerns have been expressed about: the level of the
minimum wage, the impact of privatization on workers' rights, and discrimination
between families of war victims, 261 which can be considered pertinent to duties to
respect human rights; gender stereotypes, domestic violence, human trafficking
and racial prejudice,262 all of which can be seen as matters of protecting human
rights; and finally unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, consumption of illegal
drugs, HIV/AIDS, housing and the education of Romani children, 63 which
envisage state duties to fulfill human rights, even where neither state nor private
delict can be said to be the cause of the human rights failure.
The duty to respect, protect and fulfill economic, social and cultural rights
was entrenched in the Maastricht guidelines on violations of economic, social and
cultural rights.264 Although these guidelines are not strictly limited to the ICESCR,
they are clearly influenced by the work of the CESCR and are intended to provide
further clarification of what is required of states to fulfill their treaty obligations
under the Covenant. The tertiary framework is explicitly introduced with the
comment that "[l]ike civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights
impose three different types of obligations on States: the obligations to respect,
protect and fulfill. ' 265 It is significant that the tertiary framework is not considered
some special characteristic of economic, social and cultural rights, but in fact
pervades the whole range of international human rights. 66
Obligations of conduct and result are distinguished in the Maastricht
Guidelines, although more in line with the French understanding of obligation de
moyens (obligation to act to a professional standard) and obligation de r~sultat
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he or she is the author (art. 15), 71 28-34, 44-46, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan.
12, 2006), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 131, 137-39, 142-43;
ECOSOC, General Comment No. 18: The right to work (art. 6), 77 22-28, 33-36, U.N. Doe.
E/C. 12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 148,
153-54, 156-57.
260. See, e.g., infra notes 262-64.
261. ECOSOC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Uzbekistan, 15, 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/UZB/CO/1 (Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter CESCR
Uzbekistan 2005]; ECOSOC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 15, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BIH/CO/1 (Nov. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter CESCR Bosnia 2005].
262. CESCR Uzbekistan 2005, supra note 261, 17 24-25; CESCR Bosnia 2005, supra note 261, 1
21-22; ECOSOC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1 12, 14, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/LYB/CO/2 (Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter CESCR
Libya 2005].
263. CESCR Uzbekistan 2005, supra note 261, 77 17, 27, 31-33; CESCR Bosnia 2005, supra note
261, 17 13, 23, 24, 29; CESCR Libya 2005, supra note 262, 17 15, 17, 19.
264. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 691 (1998) [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines].
265. Id. at 693.
266. See, e.g., ECOSOC, General Comment No. 12, supra note 259, 15, at 66; ECOSOC,




(obligation to achieve a particular end), rather than the distinction introduced by
Ago in the first reading of the ILC Articles between obligations of conduct
(obligations to do something specific) and obligations of result (obligations to
achieve a particular end, with discretion as to means).267 The Maastricht guidelines
indicate a degree of discretion for obligations of conduct in determining which
particular measures should be taken ("measures reasonably calculated", or "all
268appropriate means") that does not fit with Ago's understanding.
A chapter on state responsibility for violations (whether from failure to
respect, protect or fulfill, from action or omission) is contained in the Maastricht
guidelines.269 It is based on territorial control, prima facie jurisdiction, but in the
case of alien domination or occupation, also "effective control. '270 In this context,
"effective control" is intended to mean effective control of a physical location or
over individual potential victims, not control over perpetrators in the Nicaragua
sense.271 The intention is to ensure that where states operate outside of their own
territory (such as in situations of military occupation or peacekeeping), state actors
must respect the human rights of all those over whom they exercise authority and
also exercise due diligence to protect the human rights of those persons.272 The
duty of due diligence in control of private entities, "including transnational
corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction" to guarantee ICESCR rights is
specified.273 States are also reminded of their responsibility for acts of international
organizations of which they are members and should ensure they too conform to
the Covenant.274
Violations of the ICESCR "are in principle imputable to the State within
whose jurisdiction they occur., 275 However, from the examples given, it is quite
clear violations are violations by state organs or agents, or omissions where the
state had a duty to act.276 To the extent private violations of human rights occur,
state responsibility, under the Maastricht guidelines, depends on due diligence.
277
State responsibility, therefore, is not engaged every time someone's rights are
apparently infringed; responsibility of the state will depend on a separate delict,
most commonly in the form of an omission, but also possibly in the form of
tolerance or a cover-up on the part of the state, e.g. in disappearances or domestic
violence cases. Responsibility is not for the injury, but for the state's tolerance or
attempt to cover-up. As long as minimum core obligations are satisfied, such as
access to basic food and healthcare, the state will have a defense of having taking
267. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 264, at 694; on possible confusion arising from the
terminology, see supra note 92.
268. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 264, at 694; ICESCR, supra note 228, art. 2(1).
269. Id. at 698.
270. Id.
271. Id.; see Nicaragua, supra note 2, 115 at 65.




276. Id at 696-97.
277. Id.
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"all appropriate means" within the context of its own condition of economic
development to prevent or redress the private wrong or to ensure that the rights
under the ICESCR have been fulfilled.278
In case it be thought that the ICESCR is a special case of mandating positive
rights, the work of the HRC should also be examined. Again, the concluding
comments on state reports demonstrate that the HRC considers state parties
responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights contained in
the ICCPR.27 9 Their work demonstrates an emphatic rejection of the purported
division of positive and negative rights between the two covenants, this distinction
having long been rubbished in academic commentary.2 8 °
As early as 1981, the HRC expressed the view that it was inadequate for state
parties to "respect" human rights, but that they must also take positive measures to
guarantee their full enjoyment for all inhabitants:
The Committee considers it necessary to draw the attention of States
parties to the fact that the obligation under the Covenant is not confined
to the respect of human rights, but that States parties have also
undertaken to ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all individuals
under their jurisdiction... in principle this undertaking relates to all
rights set forth in the Covenant.
281
This comment was superseded in 2004 by General Comment No. 31, issued in
response to the ILC Articles.282 Like its predecessor, it emphasizes the positive
duties that state parties to the ICCPR have accepted and specifically explains that
although there is no direct horizontal effect (i.e. individuals do not have obligations
under the Convention), states must "exercise due diligence to prevent, punish,
investigate or redress" violations by private persons or entities.283 The beneficiaries
of the obligations are human beings, but not only citizens; instead, all persons
within the "effective control" of the state must be protected. 284 Although the HRC
could not have been unaware of the meaning of "effective control" in Nicaragua,
in the General Comment it does not refer to "effective control" of the actors, but
278. Id. at 695.
279. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Report of the Human Rights Committee on the
Eighty-fifth, Eighty-sixth & Eighty-seventh Sessions Vol. 1, 67, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 40,
U.N. Doc. A/61/40, (2006) [hereinafter HRC 2006 Report].
280. Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?
Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46, 71 (1992); C~cile Fabre,
Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263, 268-70 (1998); HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 180-86 (2d ed.
2000).
281. HRC, General Comment No. 3: Article 2 (Implementation at the national level), 1, reprinted
in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 164.
282. HRC, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
State Parties to the Covenant, supra note 252, 1.
283. Id. 8, at 235.
284. Id. 10, at236.
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rather "effective control" of "territory and jurisdiction." 285 This use is comparable
to that found in the Maastricht guidelines.286
Although not following the terminology of duties to respect, to protect and to
fulfill, recognition of state responsibility at all three levels is implicit in the HRC's
output as can be seen from the example of General Comment No. 28 on gender
equality. 287 Duties to respect human rights in this Comment include review of
domestic law to ensure women do not face direct discrimination, for example, with
regard to regulations on women's clothing, women's freedom to travel, access to
judicial process, marriage and its dissolution, and social security law.288 States
should also report on conditions for women in prison.289 However, the need for
"positive measures in all areas so as to achieve the effective and equal
empowerment of women" makes it quite clear that the duty to respect is not the
beginning and end of state responsibility. 290 State parties must protect women and
girls from murder and infanticide within the family, domestic violence and other
violence including rape and female genital mutilation, trafficking and forced
prostitution, and discrimination in employment. 291  Furthermore, states should
report on their efforts to fulfill women's rights to the same degree as those of men
by providing information on maternal and infant mortality, poverty and deprivation
amongst women, and "must...take effective and positive measure" to promote
women's equal participation in public life, "including appropriate affirmative
action."
292
Concluding observations from recent state reports also demonstrate
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.293 Examples of concerns
about respect of human rights include the conduct of law enforcement personnel,
conditions of suspects in the "war on terror," deportation to face the risk of torture,
women in prison, especially mothers, and de jure discrimination against native
women and their children.294 Duties to protect human rights are evident in the
HRC's interest in domestic violence, the high rate of violent death amongst native
women, slavery and human trafficking, hate speech, violence and hate crime
against gays and lesbians, and gender discrimination in employment.295
Responsibility to fulfill human rights is apparent where the HRC considers the
285. Id; Cf ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 2(1) (requiring states to "respect and ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant").
286. See supra text accompanying note 270; see also HRC 2006 Report, supra note 279, 84(10).
But see Bankovi6 v. Belgium, (Admissibility) (No. 52207/99), 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335; Evans,
supra note 250, at 152 (indicating a different approach in the European Court of Human Rights).
287. HRC, General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The equality of rights between men and women),
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 218.
288. Id. 13, 16, 18, 25-26, 31, at 220-24.
289. Id. 115, at 220-21.
290. Id 3, at 218.
291. Id. 10-12, 31, at 220, 224.
292. Id. 10, 29 at 220, 224.
293. See, e.g., HRC 2006 Report, supra note 279, 76(15), 78(12), 79(10)-(11), 81(16), 84.
294. Id.
295. Id. 76(23), 78, 79(9), 81(12), 84(28).
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conditions of life for street children, Roma, and the unequal racial impact of
homelessness and natural disasters.296
The majority of communications considered by the HRC pertain to purported
violations by state organs, i.e. violations of the duty to respect human rights which
would engage liability within the Nicaragua paradigm. 97
State responsibility for a failure to respect human rights will depend on
attribution to a state organ or agent identified per Nicaragua. As under the
ICESCR, state responsibility is not automatic for every private delict but will
always depend on evidence of a separate delict on the part of the state, as will
responsibility for failure to fulfill human rights.298 Responsibility for failing to
protect or fulfill the rights of the ICCPR will depend on evidence that the state has
not taken the (positive) measures that it should have, i.e. it has not acted with due
diligence.299
The texts of CEDAW, the CRC and MWC all indicate an explicit acceptance
by state parties of positive obligations and, unsurprisingly, their respective treaty
bodies support the tertiary model of state responsibility.3 °0 With reference to
296. Id. 71 78, 79(22), 84(26).
297. See id TT 107-226 (summarizing cases by issue, including procedural matters from 107-43,
substantive matters from 144-202, and remedies from 203-26).
298. See Nicaragua, supra note 2, 269.
299. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 2(2).
300. CEDAW, supra note 230, arts. 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14; CRC, supra note 232, arts. 11, 19, 20,
23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32-36, 39; MWC, supra note 233, arts. 25, 28, 30, 31, 43, 45, 68. Duties at all three
levels are ubiquitous in the concluding comments of the Women's Committee and the Children's
Committee. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No.
38, U.N. Doc. A/61/38 (2006); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Kazakhstan, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/KAZ/CO/3 (June 19, 2007); U.N.
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child. Uruguay, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/URY/CO/2 (July 5, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the Rights
of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Maldives, 45th
Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MDV/CO/3 (July 13, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Slovakia, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SVK/CO/2 (July 19, 2007). At the time of writing, the Migrant Workers' Committee had
reviewed only three state reports, but, as well as duties on state actors to respect human rights, duties to
protect and fulfill are also illustrated. For example, duties to protect are illustrated in concerns about
discrimination against migrant workers, human trafficking, violence and exploitation facing migrant
workers, especially domestic workers, and the vulnerability of unaccompanied minors to abuse and
exploitation. Additionally, duties to fulfill are illustrated in concerns about access to school for migrant
workers' children and access to medical care. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Protection of the Rights ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: Mali, 71 22-23, U.N.
Doc. CMW/C/MLI/CO/l (May 31, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Protection
of the Rights ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: Mexico, 11 24, 27, 29, 33, 39, 41,
U.N. Doc. CMW/C/MEX/CO/1 (Dec. 20, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: Egypt, 1 20, 36, 38, 50, U.N.
Doc. CMW/C/EGY/CO/l (Dec. 20, 2006).
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broader norms of state responsibility, the Women's Committee reminds state
parties in General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women: "[u]nder
general international law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be
responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing




Of the few communications to date considered by the Women's Committee,
three stand out as "classic" examples of state failure to protect human rights, each
being concerned with domestic violence. The first, A. T. v Hungary, is perhaps a
paradigm of the discourse between treaty body and state party envisaged by the
drafters of the Protocol. 30 3  In this case, the communications system brings a
problem to the attention of a state party, the state acknowledges that its legal
system and institutions are inadequate, promises to take measures to improve
protection even before the inevitable finding of a violation of CEDAW, and
further, at least according to the state party, these measures have largely now been
introduced.3° The other two communications, Goekce v Austria3°5 and Yildirim v
306Austria ° , warrant less optimism, not the least of which because by the time of the
communication, the victims had already been murdered by violent partners, but
also because of the adversarial and defensive response of the state party which
insisted that its institutions had not failed either victim and that, in the former case
at least, the victim herself bore responsibility for having failed to leave, implying
301. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation
No. 19: Violence against women, 7 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/38, reprinted in Compilation of General
Comments, supra note 234, at 303.
302. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation
No. 24: Article 12 of the convention (women and health), 77 13-17, A/54/38Rev.1, reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 332-33; U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 25: Article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Convention (temporary special measures), 4, A/54/38Rev.1, reprinted in Compilation of General
Comments, supra note 234, at 337.
303. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3 of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Communication No. 2/2003, Ms. A. T. v. Hungary, in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/60/38(Part I) Annex III 77 9.3-9.7 [hereinafter AT. v
Hungary].
304. Id. 7 5.6-5.10. See also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Sixth Periodic Report of the Republic of Hungary to the United Nations on the Elimination ofAll Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, arts. 1-4, 16, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/HUN/6 (June 15, 2006).
305. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Communication No. 5/2005, Goekce v. Austria, Annex, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (Aug. 6,
2007) [hereinafter Goekce v. Austria].
306. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Communication No. 6/2005, Yildirim v. Austria, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (Oct. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter Yildirim v. Austria].
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that the violence that marred the relationship was attributable equally to the victim
and even playing a cultural relativism card, suggesting that the perpetrator's
"background" (Turkish) explains and justifies his "harsh statements" (i.e. death-
threats).
3 7
The Women's Committee's approach in all three cases is to recognize the
duty of "due diligence," with particular reference to General Recommendation
19.308 This has been violated by both state parties, but in subtly different manner.
In the Austrian cases, there are laws and institutions in place which should provide
protection to the standard required by CEDAW. However, there has been a
manifest failure by the state organs to apply them to the necessary extent. This is
the separate delict. By contrast, Hungary simply lacked the necessary mechanisms
altogether. There was no single state organ that could be said to have failed to
exercise due diligence because no single state organ had the power to take the
requisite action to protect A.T. Instead, the fault, the separate delict, attaches to
the "state authorities considered as a whole" for not ensuring a system of
protection to meet its primary obligations.
30 9
Where the Women's Committee's analysis departs from that of the Court in
the Genocide Convention case is in the former's lack of concern with the matter of
causation. 3 10 In cases of non-state perpetrators of human rights violations, it can
perhaps never be conclusively established that even had the state taken all
appropriate measures, the violation would have been prevented. This is especially
so with regard to cases of domestic violence; in the most progressive states with
extensive legal and social protection for victims of domestic violence and
dedicated efforts to change cultural norms that perpetuate the acceptability of such
violence, domestic violence still occurs, even to the extent of homicide.
It must also be recalled that the principles for reparation to an injured state for
failing to prevent genocide as considered by the Court need not be equivalent to
the principles for reparation to injured human persons under human rights treaties.
Causation is briefly mentioned as necessary to establish a right to reparation in the
second reading of the ILC Articles, but is drafted in view of injuries to other states,
not injuries to human persons.311 It is also made clear in the commentary that the
principles of causation are an aspect of primary, not secondary, rules and hence,
there is no standard of causation common to all primary rules.
312
The Women's Committee, furthermore, has not hindered itself to the same
extent as the Court in the Genocide Convention case with an insurmountable
307. Goekce v. Austria, supra note 305, T 8.8. See also id TT 4.2-4.5, 8.4-8.6, 8.14.
308. A.T v. Hungary, supra note 303, 1 9.2; Goekce v. Austria, supra note 305, 1 12.1.1, 12.3;
Yildirim v. Austria, supra note 306, 1 12.1.1.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
310. See supra text accompanying note 94.
311. See ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 31, at 223; see also Benedetto Conforti, Exploring the
Strasbourg Case-Law: Reflections on State Responsibility for the Breach of Positive Obligations, in
ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 250, at
129, 135-36.
312. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 31, 10, at 227-28.
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burden of proof;313 instead, to the extent that the communications process can be
considered a kind of legal proceeding, it is of a civil nature and therefore a balance
of probabilities/preponderance of evidence test is adequate.314  The Women's
Committee does not belabor the point, and the parties do not argue it, but it can be
assumed that if these two violent men had been in prison, they could not have
committed murder; if one man were not permitted access to the family home, he
would find it considerably harder to beat his ex-partner. Furthermore, the vast
majority of the remedies suggested by the Women's Committee are "forward-
looking." Only with regard to A.T. is compensation indicated (it being of little
comfort to the two deceased or their survivors in the Austrian cases) and the other
case-specific remedies are concrete suggestions as to how the state can meet the
requirements of due diligence in the particular case, namely by providing a home,
child support and legal assistance to enable A.T. to live free from violence.315 In
all three cases, systemic changes are recommended which, if implemented, would
satisfy the positive obligations of the states under CEDAW with regard to
eliminating, or at least reducing, domestic violence. 316 If these are implemented
and, notwithstanding such efforts, domestic violence continues to occur, the states
will not be easily said to bear responsibility as there will be no separate delict.
The Race Committee was ambivalent through the 1990s concerning the extent
of state obligations to protect and fulfill the rights under CERD. However, a
change of direction occurred in 1999 and was brought to the fore the following
year in General Recommendation No. XXV: Gender Related Dimensions of Racial
Discrimination. 317 The later General Recommendation pertaining to non-citizens
also indicates the need for respect, protection and fulfillment of human rights.
318
For example, state parties should eliminate discrimination in legislation and
immigration policy, and ensure law enforcement agents do not ill-treat or
discriminate against non-citizens in order to respect human rights.319 They must
also protect persons from hate speech and racial violence and discrimination in
employment. 320 Rights must also be fulfilled to ensure "equal enjoyment of the
right to adequate housing" and adequate physical and mental health.321
313. See supra note 65; see also supra text accompanying note 76.
314. See A. T v Hungary, supra note 303, at 9.3-9.6.
315. Id. 19.6(I).
316. Id. 1 9.6(11); Goekce v. Austria, supra note 305, 1 12.3; Yildirim v. Austria, supra note 306,
12.3.
317. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXV on
gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination, TT 1-6, A/55/18, Annex V at 152 (2000), reprinted
in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 258-59; see also Johnstone: Feminist
Influences, supra note 258, at 171.
318. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXX on
discrimination against non-citizens, CERD/C/59/Misc.16/Rev.3 (2001), reprinted in Compilation of
General Comments, supra note 234, at 276-77.
319. Id. 1 6,9, 13-17,21, at 274-76.
320. Id. 1 11-12, 18, 22-24 & 33-34, at 276-77.
321. Id. 132, 36, at 277.
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As for the Covenants, states are responsible for actions by their organs that
fail to respect human rights.322 Responsibility for failing to protect and fulfill
rights will depend on a separate delict, usually an omission.
The Torture Committee, as referred to previously, is bound to a definition of
torture that presupposes fairly direct attributability to the state. Torture is
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.
3 23
However, the state party also undertakes to prevent
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts
are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.
3 24
This can conceivably apply to punishment at the hands of actors who cannot, in the
Nicaragua sense, be considered state actors to the extent that the state does not
take adequate measures to protect, i.e. it effectively acquiesces in the treatment.
This still requires a separate delict on the part of some state actor, i.e. by virtue of
instigation, consent or acquiescence.
The Torture Committee in its early work focused predominantly on the duty
of states to refrain from torture or inhuman, cruel or degrading punishment, i.e. the
duty of state parties to respect human rights. However, in recent years, they have
taken a greater interest in state responsibility to protect.
The majority of communications to the Torture Committee protest threatened
or actual refoulement to face the risk of torture, which is prohibited by Article 3.325
The second most common type of complaint concerns purported failures to
investigate allegations of torture, in violation of Article 12.326 Article 3 prohibits
only refoulement "to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Refoulement to
lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not
322. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 231, arts. 1, 5, 16.
323. Id. art. 1(1).
324. Id. art. 16; see also Andrew Byrnes, The Convention Against Torture, in 2 WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 183, 187 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig, eds., 2000).
325. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Thirty-fifth &
Thirty-sixth Sessions, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 44, 79, tbl. at 88-123, U.N. Doc. A/61/44




explicitly precluded. Refoulement cases where the threat of mistreatment is not
directly attributable to the state are more likely to reach the HRC, since the ICCPR
also excludes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.32 7
Any application of the responsibility to fulfill is difficult to reconcile with the
subject matter of the treaty: how can one be "tortured" or subject to "punishment"
without any culpability either at the hands of a state or private actor? One could
theoretically conceive of certain chronic and painful health conditions which lead
to extensive suffering in the absence of palliative care, but to define these as
torture or as treatment or punishment would be to stretch the text, not to mention
the object and purpose, of CAT. Article I requires that torture be inflicted
"intentionally." Article 16 refers to other "acts" which are "committed" and
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Inertia on the
part of the state in the face of suffering which has no human cause is not covered
by CAT. Thus, we must be content to witness the Torture Committee engage in
twin duties to respect and protect human rights.
Concern about the behavior of state organs has constituted the bulk of the
Torture Committee's work until recently. Examples include violence against
prisoners, the conduct of police officers, investigation and remedies for alleged
victims of torture, the use of evidence obtained from torture, and intimidation and
harassment of human rights activists and legal professionals.32 8 More, recently,
however, CAT has expressed considerable interest in states' duties to protect their
inhabitants, querying, inter alia, caste discrimination, violence and discrimination
against Roma and foreigners, domestic violence and sexual violence against
women, trafficking in persons, protection of domestic workers, violence against
abandoned children, child abduction by non-state armed groups, and inter-prisoner
violence.329 State responsibility for these private wrongs exists by virtue of, and
327. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 7; see, e.g., HRC, Decision of the Human Rights Committee under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication
1234/2003, P.K. v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1234/2003, 4.3, 4.7 (April 3, 2007). The
Canadian response in this communication indicated that in that state's view, there must be a separate
delict on the part of the receiving state, i.e. inadequate due diligence in providing protection. As the
communication was determined inadmissible, the HRC did not comment on this argument.
328. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Nineteenth &
Twentieth Sessions, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 44, 7 49, 60-61, 64-65, 90, 116, 133, 143, 163,
176, 186, U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (Sept. 16, 1998) (considering reports issued by Cyprus, Arg., Switz.,
Cuba, Spain, Fr., Guat., N.Z., and F.R.G.); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee
Against Torture, Twenty-first & Twenty-second Sessions, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 44, 45,
U.N. Doc. A/54/44 (1999); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture,
Twenty-third & Twenty-fourth Session, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 44, 179, U.N. Doc.
A/55/44 (2000).
329. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Thirty-third Session
& Thirty-fourth Session, 7 39(g), 46(a), 46(a)(v), 47(c), 47(j), 47(k), 48(1), 83(o), 84(o), 93(h), 97(o),
108(m), 109(k), U.N. Doc. A/60/44 (2005) (considering reports issued by Arg., Greece, Alb., Uganda,
and Bahr.); Torture Committee 2006 Report, supra note 325, 77 26(12), 26(14), 27(17), 29(26), 29(32)
(considering reports from Dem. Rep. Congo, Ecuador, and Nepal); U.N. Comm. Against Torture,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions
and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, Italy, 7 21-23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/ITA/CO/4
(July 16, 2007); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties
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only in the event of, inadequate efforts by the state to prevent, investigate and
punish, i.e. a separate delict of failing to satisfy its positive obligations.
330
C. Who is the State?
The various human rights treaties may award rights to individuals, but the
obligations to guarantee those rights fall solely on states. The treaties, and their
treaty bodies, do not inform us about the direct accountability of non-state
actors.331 Similarly, the ILC Articles are focused on state responsibility, to the
exclusion of individual responsibility or, for that matter, responsibility of
international organizations. 332 From the other side, in the event of a breach of a
primary rule of international law (by a state), the ILC Articles advise us only of the
remedies that other states may have.333 Although the mandate of the ILC did not
explicitly preclude the possibility of considering state responsibility to individuals
or international organizations, it decided to concentrate only on state responsibility
vis A vis other states.334
D. Obligations to whom?
Human rights are usually understood as obligations owed by states to
individuals. The idea of "state responsibility" for human rights is usually thought
of as state responsibility to the individuals with whom it interacts. Malcolm Evans
argues that this is not really state responsibility at all, at least not in the proper
international law sense.335 Instead it is state responsibility "in the layman's sense"
and as such "has little - if anything - to do with state responsibility as an aspect of
international law and as now reflected in the ILC's Articles on State
Responsibility." 336 This, he argues, is hardly surprising, since the whole notion of
human rights is an anomaly in the Westphalian model on which the principles of
state responsibility are founded.337 Evans goes so far as to argue that human rights
might be more "aspirational" or "ethical" as opposed to "legal" claims in
international law and that this (in part) explains the modest mechanisms designed
to monitor their implementation-centering on assisting and encouraging
compliance rather than enforcing or penalizing non-compliance.
338
under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against
Torture, Japan, 24, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/JPN/CO/1 (Aug. 3, 2007).
330. Evans, supra note 250, at 150-51.
331. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 32 (2006)
(discussing objections to the concept that non-state actors have duties under human rights laws).
332. See ILC Articles, supra note 4.
333. Id. art. 42, at 54.
334. Id. art. 33(2), at 51; see Ago: Second Report 1970, supra note 120, 5, 22, 23, at 178, 184.
See generally Daniel Bodansky, John R. Crook & Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in
the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 809-11 (2002) (questioning the wisdom of the scope
of the ILC Articles); Daniel Bodansky, John R. Crook & James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 874, 886-88
(2002) (reply by the authors).
335. Evans, supra note 250, at 139.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 140.
338. Id. at 146-49; but see Theodor Meron, State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83
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State responsibility to individuals is undoubtedly a central element of human
rights law, but it is one which is quite outside the ILC Articles, which indicates
only that the Articles are "without prejudice" to such responsibility.3 39 Similarly,
the Articles only advise us as to the recourse that might be had by other states to
human rights violations.
340
What is immediately apparent with regard to the human rights treaties is that
it will be very rare indeed for another state to be "injured" by a violation. Thus the
rules of recourse for injured states under the ILC Articles will seldom be
relevant.341 Unfortunately, although recognizing the interests of third states (non-
injured states), the ILC Articles were left deliberately vague with regard to what
circumstances they might invoke responsibility and what they might do about it.
Article 48 of the ILC Articles advises us that "[a]ny State other than an injured
State" can invoke responsibility if: "(a) The obligation breached is owed to a group
of States including that State and is established for the protection of a collective
interest of the group; or (b) The obligation breached is owed to the international
community as a whole."
342
The two subsections indicate the difference between (a) obligations erga
omnes partes and (b) obligations erga omnes. In the former case, one would have
to argue that human rights are the "collective interest" of all parties to the human
rights treaty concerned, i.e. each state party has a relevant interest in compliance
by every other state.343 The latter indicates an erga omnes obligation, an obligation
owed to the entire international community. The deliberate use by the ILC of
"international community" rather than "international community of states" should
be noted. But an obligation erga omnes (as opposed to erga omnes partes) is a
matter of customary international law.344 Some human rights obligations may well
be customary international law, even erga omnes, and these may have their origins
in the human rights treaties. However, if a state wishes to rely on the erga omnes
character of a norm, then it is in fact relying on the customary international law
nature of that norm, not the treaty from which that norm originally emanated.
State invocation of the responsibility of another state for violation of a treaty norm
must depend on the obligation being characterized as erga omnes partes.
345
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 372,372-73 (1989).
339. ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 33(2), at 51.
340. Id. art. 48, at 56.
341. Id. art. 42, at 54.
342. Id. art. 48, at 56; see also id. art. 54, at 58. See generally Bodansky, Crook & Weiss, supra
note 334, at 799-805 (discussing the differences between ILC Articles 42 and 48).
343. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 48 7, at 320-21. A "common interest" is sufficient;
there need not be a direct benefit for the invoking state; regional human rights treaties are provided by
way of example.
344. Id. cmt. to art. 48 6, at 320. Obligations erga omnes partes can also arise from customary
international law, but are possible from treaty.
345. See Nicaragua, supra note 2, 178, at 95.
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General Comment No. 31 of the HRC is unclear about this:
While article 2 is couched in terms of the obligations of State parties
towards individuals as the right-holders under the Covenant, every State
party has a legal interest in the performance by every other State party
of its obligations. This follows from the fact that the "rules concerning
the basic rights of the human person" are erga omnes obligations and
that, as indicated in the fourth preambular paragraph of the Covenant,
there is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The Committee immediately adds: "Furthermore, the contractual dimension of the
treaty involves any State party to a treaty being obligated to every other State party
to comply with its undertakings under the treaty."
346
In the first extract, the HRC must be referring to customary international law
and, of course, the Charter. To this extent, it is not actually a matter for the HRC
at all because it is not a question of supervision of the treaty. The second extract
indicates that the HRC views the ICCPR as creating obligations erga omnes
partes. Article 41, which allows for states to raise concerns regarding the (non-)
performance by other state parties, must only apply to the latter.
Under ILC Article 48, states can seek limited remedies, namely, (a) cessation
of the breach and assurances of non-repetition; and (b) reparation in the interests of
the injured state or other beneficiary (e.g. individual whose human rights have
been violated). They cannot seek compensation as they have not suffered loss.
34 7
The section on counter-measures in the ILC Articles was one of the most
controversial and the vagueness to be found therein is evidently the result of trying
to reach a text that the maximum number of experts - and states - could agree
upon. The rights of non-injured states to take countermeasures are not explained.
Only states' rights to take "lawful measures" are explained, although the content of
"lawful measures" is not otherwise defined.348 Practice is described by the ILC as
"limited and rather embryonic.,
349
Nevertheless, the answer to the question: "has state X breached its obligation
under Treaty Y?" does not depend upon to whom the obligation is owed. The
obligation (a primary rule) has either been breached or it has not. The person,
injured state, or non-injured state seeking redress will be relevant to the available
remedies, but does not change the answer to the question of whether the primary
rule has been respected or not.
346. HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note 252, 4 2 at 233.
347. ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 48, at 56 (a state suffering loss is instead an "injured state").
348. Id. art. 54, at 58. See CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 49, 56. See generally Bodansky, Crook &
Crawford, supra note 334, at 884-85. On the use of the term "measures" rather than "counter-
measures", see Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral
Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1127, 1143; Xue Hanqin,
The State of State Responsibility, 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC., 172, 172-76 (2002) (remarks by the
author discussing the danger of vagueness).
349. ILC Articles. supra note 4, cmt. to art. 54, 3, at 351.
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However, the identification of the state remains a matter of secondary rules;
for whose conduct (or omissions) is the state responsible? The answer to this
question, according to the treaty bodies, is compatible with the ILC Articles 4 and
8, and the findings of the Court in Nicaragua and the Genocide Convention case.
E. Who is the State that must "respect, protect and fulfill"?
The obligation to respect, protect and fulfill human rights falls, according to
the treaty bodies, on states and not on private actors. State responsibility to respect
human rights is engaged where a state actor - identifiable in accordance with
Nicaragua has behaved in such a way as to violate an enumerated human right.
Responsibility to protect and fulfill human rights may be triggered by the actions
of some non-state actors, but the responsibility of the state depends always on a
separate delict - i.e. something done or, more commonly, not done by the state, as
classically defined.3 5 °
The treaties impose positive obligations on states; refraining from action is
inadequate for their implementation. Those positive obligations are subject to the
standards of due diligence. 351 The actual requirements on states, that is, the degree
of diligence due, is a matter of the primary rules, not the secondary rules of state
responsibility which only come into play once it can be established that the
primary rules have been breached. That is to say, the rules of state responsibility
are relevant once it can be said that the state has not acted with due diligence.
Related, and also pertaining to the primary rules, is the matter of fault.3 2 In
some cases, particularly cases of negative obligations (such as obligations to
respect human rights), a state actor must be identified as having been at fault.353
On the other hand, in cases of positive obligations (such as obligations to protect
and to fulfill), responsibility does not depend on identifying any particular state
organ or agent that acted or failed to act in a particular way (i.e. subjective fault),
but depends on an overall failure (i.e. objective fault).354
In all cases, it is not enough that an individual not enjoy their human rights for
the state to be held responsible under the treaties. A woman may be beaten by her
partner, but the state only bears responsibility if it has an inadequate police and
criminal justice response or if it tolerates and makes no effort to reform a cultural
environment that considers spousal abuse a right of men. She may die in childbirth
but the state is only in violation of her right to life or right to health if it has not, in
light of its degree of economic development, provided adequate antenatal, birth
and post-partum services.
Theodor Meron has described the law of state responsibility as terra incognita
for human rights lawyers, a theme that Dominic McGoldrick adopts to review
350. Evans, supra note 250, at 150-51.
351. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 44-45.
352. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 2, 11 3, 10, at 69-70, 73; see CRAW-ORD, supra note
92, at 13.
353. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi. supra note 100, at 26.
354 See supra text accompanying notes 10 1-05.
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whether or not the HRC applies state responsibility in the classical sense.355
McGoldrick's conclusion is that "[i]ntemational human rights lawyers.. .have
really been operationalising the principles of State responsibility all of the time.,
356
The application by the treaty bodies, some wittingly, some impliedly, of the
tertiary model is in harmony with the classical doctrine.
The content of the obligations whether to respect or whether to protect or
fulfill, and if so, to what extent - is a matter of the primary rules; but the act or
omission which gives rise to responsibility of the state is an act or omission of a
state organ as traditionally understood. There is no implied guarantee of the
conduct of non-state actors;357 instead there is only an explicit guarantee that the
state will take particular steps, the content of which is defined and refined by the
work of the treaty bodies.
The treaty bodies could perhaps assist clarity in this matter with a more
concerted focus on what they mean by "responsibility" so as to reduce confusion.
It must be recalled that membership of the treaty bodies is not restricted to those
with a legal education, and less still, specialists in international law. Nor is it even
desirable that membership be so restricted: legal fluency should not be prioritized
over, for example, experience of children's welfare, psychology and development
in the Children's Committee; nor should experts in the psychology and physiology
of torture victims be precluded from the Torture Committee in favor of more
lawyers. Nevertheless, lawyers are on the treaty bodies, and they might encourage
a more legalistic use of the language of responsibility.
358
V. CHORALE OR CACOPHONY
This paper is specifically about state responsibility, so the author has not
inquired about the direct international responsibility of non-state actors, such as
genocidaires, terrorists or private violators of human rights. Rules of personal
accountability in international law do not alter the question of state responsibility,
as both can exist together.
A. Who is the State?
The Court, the Council and the treaty bodies all operate relatively
autonomously of one another in the broader institutional framework of the United
Nations. Nevertheless, state responsibility in all three cases depends on the
identification of the organs and agents of the state for whose actions and omissions
the state can be held accountable.
Under the Genocide Convention, state parties have mostly negative duties:
duties to refrain from committing genocide, conspiring to commit genocide,
inciting genocide, attempting to commit genocide and being complicit in
355. Meron, supra note 338, at 372; McGoldrick, supra note 253, at 162.
356. McGoldrick, supra note 253, at 199.
357. See Caron, supra note 10, at 127; see also infra text accompanying note 392.
358. Lawyers, around half of whom are specialists in international law, make up the vast majority
of the HRC, but do not enjoy the same dominance in the other treaty bodies. All the treaty bodies,
however, have some experts in international law.
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genocide. 359 State responsibility for any of these actions will depend upon evidence
of them having been undertaken by an agent of the state; either a de jure organ or
an organ de facto, by virtue of complete dependence; or a person or group
considered an agent by virtue of effective control over the relevant operation.3 60
States also have positive obligations under the Genocide Convention to
prevent and punish genocide. 361 For the state to be considered in breach of these
obligations it is not necessary to show that any particular state organ or agent has
failed, but just that there has been an overall failure.362 The relevant point is that
no state organ or agent has taken the required steps. They have not exercised due
diligence. The state will not be held responsible for any genocide or attempted
genocide that follows their inaction or ineptitude, but only for the separate delict of
their failure to intervene.363
Counter-terrorism obligations on states likewise have positive and negative
aspects. A state must refrain from "organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating" in terrorism outside of its own borders.364 State responsibility will
once more depend upon the attribution of any of these behaviors to the state
identified per Nicaragua as de jure organs, de facto organs or agents by virtue of
effective control over specific operations.365 The state is responsible for any attack
it undertakes itself. Its responsibility for organizing, instigating or assisting is,
however, responsibility for its participation, not for the terrorist attacks that may
result. This responsibility is engaged even if no terrorist attack follows.
States also have positive duties to prevent terrorism and, following the 2001
attacks, these are stricter and more precise.366 Responsibility, similarly to the duty
to prevent and punish genocide, hinges upon a separate delict - the inadequacy of
the state's efforts, or efforts below the threshold of due diligence. No state organ
has taken adequate measures. The state is responsible for its failure, for its
separate delict, but not for the terrorist attacks that follow and will be responsible
even in the absence of an actual terrorist attack.
There is an argument that can be made that states taking inadequate measures,
i.e. not meeting the requirements of due diligence, should be held directly
responsible for any resulting terrorist attacks. This would indicate a dramatic shift
in the secondary rules of state responsibility and whilst it may be reflected in some
recent opinio juris, it cannot be established from the Council resolutions.
367
International human rights law imposes both positive and negative obligations
on states. They have negative duties to refrain from certain behaviors to ensure
359. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 30-79.
361. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 1.
362. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 430-3 1, at 294-95.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 80-104.
364. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 128, paras. 8-9 (1st princ.).
365. See supra text accompanying note 196-97; see also supra text accompanying notes 32-34; see
also Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 385-93.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 201-11.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 212-19.
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respect for human rights. State parties to the relevant treaties may not, for
example, torture, detain indefinitely without trial, forbid women from paid
employment or execute minors. 368  State responsibility for violation of these
obligations requires the involvement of a person or organ considered an organ of
the state per Nicaragua.
369
State responsibility for violation of positive duties, on the other hand, does not
require the identification of a particular state organ at fault; it is the fact that no
state organ has taken the requisite steps that is pertinent.
370 These are obligations
of due diligence. Infringement may depend on the actions of a non-state actor,
such as the duty to prevent violence within the family or trafficking.
371  On the
other hand, for some violations it will not be necessary to demonstrate any
individual wrongdoer. The state can be responsible for high rates of maternal
mortality, extensive unemployment, low rates of formal education, and even
anorexia.372 State responsibility is not for the injury itself, but for its failure to
exercise due care and attention in its prevention, and/or inquiry and punishment
into its violation. In the case of anorexia, it is not the illness itself for which the
state is responsible but for its separate delict in not taking adequate measures to
reduce its incidence, for example, by educating young persons and monitoring
media and cultural influence.
373
In all three examples of positive measures, pertaining to genocide, counter-
terrorism and human rights, state responsibility depends upon a separate delict and
that separate delict can be most simply understood as "not trying hard enough."
The determination of what constitutes "trying hard enough" is a matter of the
primary rules.
One further point to note is that positive obligations can be contracted out.
The state need not do everything itself. It is important that they are fulfilled; it is
less important by whom. In each example considered here, with admittedly greater
and lesser probability, the state could engage a private contractor to undertake the
duties. A state could hire a private force to arrest persons suspected of
involvement in genocide; it might pay a for-profit company to create and enforce
rules for financial institutions to reduce the likelihood of funds reaching terrorists;
it can similarly pay corporations to provide healthcare services. If these private
contractors fail, responsibility will fall back upon the state for not having obtained
368. CAT, supra note 231, arts. 1, 2; ICCPR, supra note 227, arts. 6(5), 7, 9; ICESCR, supra note
228, arts. 3, 6-7; CEDAW, supra note 230, art. 11; CRC, supra note 232, art. 37.
369. See supra text accompanying note 350.
370. See supra text accompanying note 102; see also Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
429.
371. ICCPR, supra note 227, arts. 8, 12, 23; ICESCR, supra note 228, art. 12; CAT, supra note
231, art. 16; CRC, supra note 232, arts. 11, 19, 32, 34-35; MWC, supra note 233, arts. 11, 16.
372. ICESCR, supra note 228, arts. 6, 12-14; CRC, supra note 232, arts. 24, 28-29; MWC, supra
note 233, art. 30; see also U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Report of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, Twenty-seventh Session, 68, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/i 08 (July 23, 2001); U.N. Comm.
on the Rights of the Child, Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Twenty-fourth Session,
245, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/97 (July 17, 2000).
373. CRC, supra note 232, art. 17.
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more able contractors or not undertaking the tasks itself, the state's positive
obligations have not been fulfilled. On the other hand, should the contractors
violate negative obligations (such as the duty to respect human rights or to refrain
from violating the sovereignty of another state), states will bear responsibility,
even in the absence of effective control, if the contractors exercise "elements of
governmental authority." The ILC acknowledges the imprecision of this latter
term and considers it a somewhat contextual standard which will vary between
states.
B. What Does This Mean for State Responsibility?
This has assumed so far that the positive or negative aspect of states' duties
can be easily identified. In practice, however, as has long been recognized in the
realm of human rights law, the distinction between positive and negative
obligations is not straightforward. 375 This can be illustrated by the example of the
right to life. The ICCPR informs us that "[e]very human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life. 3 76 Textual, contextual or object and purpose interpretations
of this article all yield the same conclusion: state parties have both negative and
positive obligations under this article. The negative duties include refraining from
arbitrary execution or reckless killing by state organs or agents and restraint in the
use of the death penalty within the criminal justice system.377 The positive duties
(to protect) include operating a functional legal system to prevent private killing
3 78
and duties to fulfill the right to life for vulnerable members.379 In this latter
context, the HRC considers it "desirable for States parties to take all possible
measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy... ,380
Responsibility will be engaged in the event of failure by the appropriate
institutions. 381 This might include tolerance of domestic murders displayed by
poor investigation and lower sentencing of offenders, or a refusal to investigate
fully allegations of murder and disappearances of political activists which have
taken place without proven links to state organs. 382 Responsibility can also be
engaged if the state simply does not maintain the necessary institutions, such as
police services, prosecutors and court officials to provide the requisite level of
374. See ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 5. cmt. to art. 5 11 5-6, at 92, 94; see also Marina Spinedi,
La Responsabilitt) dello Stato per Comportamenti di Private Contractors, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA
RESPONSABILITA 1NTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI ALIA PROVA DEI FATT, supra note 37, at 67,99-103.
375, Sce supra text accompanying note 280.
376. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 6.
377, i.: see also HRC, General Comment No, 6: Article 6 (Right to life) 3, 6-7, reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments. supra note 234, at 167.
378, ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 6.
'79. See. eg.. MWC, supra note 233, pmbl., arts. 9-10; see also CRC, supra note 232. pmbl., arts.
2,6.
380, HRC. General Comment No. 6, supra note 377, 5, at 167,
81. See ECOSOC. General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties' obligations (art. 2. para.
1. ofthe Covenant) IM 1-6. 10, reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234. at 15-
17.
382. HRC, General Comment No. 6, supra note 377,14, at 167.
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protection, or inadequate or non-existent health services and guarantees of
nutrition for the poorest members of the state.383
The character of an obligation as positive or negative is part of the primary
rules and thus not part of the law of state responsibility. However, as the
discussion above demonstrates, the characterization of an obligation as positive or
negative has a crucial impact on the rules of state responsibility, in particular,
whether an organ or agent of the state needs to be identified at all.
These three distinct areas of international law examined, and the institutions
that have worked with them, contain very different primary rules, in particular,
very different expectations about the positive obligations of states. The standards
required, or the degree of diligence due, depend on primary rules. However,
ultimately, the secondary rules of state responsibility are the same.
The distinction between primary and secondary rules was introduced by Ago
and is defended by Crawford, the rapporteur who saw the conclusion of the ILC
Articles as "provid[ing] the key to their completion as well as their scope. It may
be supported by a number of reasons, principled as well as pragmatic."384 He
describes this distinction as "indispensable" to the conclusion of the ILC's project
because primary rules, including rules about the content of obligations and
requirements of fault, are in a constant state of flux and negotiation.385 The pace at
which the primary obligations of states pertaining to counter-terrorism have
changed bears out this concern. The ILC's concentration on state responsibility is
an exposition of the "underlying structures," which are "less fluid, more
durable." 386 Indeed, the ILC would have come in for considerable criticism if,
after decades of laborious negotiations, they had concluded a draft which would
become obsolete in a few years. The distinction between primary and secondary
rules was also recognized by the Court, even before the conclusion of the ILC's
second reading.
387
Nevertheless, the distinction between primary and secondary rules has not
been without its critics. For example, Bodansky and Crook argue that the
distinction is artificial and potentially misleading. 388 David Caron laments the
resulting abstract nature of secondary rules which makes it "quite complex to
translate these articles to the real world of dispute resolution., 389  Crawford
acknowledges that it is a rare dispute that concerns only secondary rules in which
383. For further discussion of this and other examples, see Scott & Macklem, supra note 280, 48-
71.
384. Bodansky, Crook & Crawford, supra note 334, at 877.
385. CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 15.
386. Id
387. See Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, T 47, at 38 (Sept. 25);
Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, The ILC's State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 773-74 (2002).
388. Bodansky & Crook, supra note 387, at 780-81.
389. David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship
between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 870-72 (2002).
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breach of the primary rules is acknowledged; instead, real world disputes contain
elements of both.390
The three examples considered do seem to suggest that whilst state
responsibility can be understood in the abstract as an academic concept, its
application (and hence, perhaps, its usefulness) will require an extensive
examination of the primary rules in every case. This becomes even more
problematic when the difficulties of distinguishing positive and negative
obligations are taken into account.
Crawford explains the status quo thus:
Whatever the range of state obligation in international law, the ways of
identifying the state for the purposes of determining breach appear to be
common... Rarely (and never, as far as I am aware, by implication) is
the state taken to have guaranteed the conduct of its nationals or of
other persons on its territory, even when it has entered into obligations
in completely general terms. The rules of attribution are thus an
implicit basis of all international obligations so far as the state is
concerned.391
David Caron warns against extending the responsibility of the state to make it
a guarantor for all operations within its territory:
If the State were responsible [for all wrongful acts within its
jurisdiction], then it would assume the position of insurer of the victim
in a myriad of cases. If the State were responsible, the rule would
encourage greater control by the State of persons and entities within its
jurisdiction - a possibility we should consider with care.
39 2
In fact, despite Derek Jinks' concerns to the contrary, it appears that the
secondary rules of international have held fast.39 3 The state does not "insure"
potential victims against the behavior of the persons, natural and legal, operating
within its jurisdiction. Even where primary rules change, by slow evolution in the
case of human rights or by a sudden jolt in the case of counter-terrorism, the rules
of state responsibility remain the same. States may accept positive duties, by
virtue of treaty, through acquiescence to developments in customary international
law, or, more controversially, by acceptance of Council resolutions. The coming
years may bear witness to further stresses on these norms, particularly in the area
of counter-terrorism, but for now, the ILC Articles accurately describe the
applicable framework. Ultimately, these three institutions, the Court, the Council
and the committees, connected to one another by the loosest of threads, are
performing in the same key.
390. CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 9.
391. Bodansky, Crook & Crawford, supra note 334, at 878-79.
392. Caron, supra note 10, at 127.
393. Jinks, supra note 132, at 83-84.
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